Location:
COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, SECOND DISTRICT
Attorneys:
James Marion Moorman Public Defender and John C. Fisher Assistant Public Defender Bartow for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth Counsel General Tallahassee and Dale E. Tarpley Assistant Counsel General Tampa for Appellee.
Court:
DANAHY A.C.J. and ALTENBERND and QUINCE JJ. Concur.
Author:
The Hon Justice Per Curiam.
Devell Hawkins appeals his judgments and sentences for two counts of attempted armed robbery with a mask. His Counsel filed an Anders *fn1 brief raising several issues. The state concedes and we agree that Mr. Hawkins' judgment incorrectly reflects that he was sentenced for a first-degree felony. See Spicer v. State 615 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). On remand the judgment should be corrected to reflect a conviction for a second-degree felony.
We also strike the $2 cost imposed pursuant to section 943.25(13) Florida Statutes (1993) because the trial court did not announce this discretionary cost at sentencing. See Reyes v. State 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The cost/fine de scribed in the judgment totaling $1,245 and a second cost/fine totaling $2,500 that was imposed as a condition of probation are stricken. Barnes v. State 658 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
We affirm probation condition 5 prohibiting Mr. Hawkins from using intoxicants to excess because it is a general condition that does not require oral pronouncement. State v. Hart 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1996). The portion of condition 3 prohibiting Mr. Hawkins from possessing destructive devices and weapons must be stricken because it is a special condition that must be orally announced. Johnson v. State 662 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Condition 6 must be amended to require Mr. Hawkins to work faithfully "insofar as may be possible." SEC. 948.03(1)(c) Fla. Stat. (1993). We also strike the portion of that condition which requires Mr. Hawkins to report his supervision status to his employer. Bristol v. State 667 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Finally we strike the portion of condition 8 requiring Mr. Hawkins to pay for random drug and alcohol testing because it is a special condition that must be orally announced at sentencing. Malone v. State 652 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
We affirm Mr. Hawkins' judgments and sentences in all other respects.
DANAHY A.C.J. and ALTENBERND and QUINCE JJ. Concur.
Notes:
*fn1 Anders v. California 386 U.S. 738 87 S. Ct. 1396 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).