Debra Jobes brought a defamation and invasion of privacy action against her employer Tokheim Corporation and its personnel manager Robert Nichols. Later the trial court granted summary judgment to her employer and its personnel manager and she appeals. *fn1 Her appeal presents the following issues for our review:

I.

Whether the evidence designated by Tokheim in support of its summary judgment motion was sufficient to meet the requirements of Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

II.

Whether summary judgment was appropriate because Jobes' claims are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.

We affirm.

The facts most favorable to Jobes reveal that on March 25 1992 Jobes was injured on the job at Tokheim's factory in Fort Wayne Indiana. While Jobes was being treated for her injury Tokheim instructed her treating physician to test Jobes' blood for the presence of illegal drugs. Jobes tested positive for illegal drugs. On April 1 1992 Tokheim terminated Jobes' employment. Thereafter U.A.W. Local Union 159 ("the Union") filed a grievance on Jobes' behalf challenging the drug testing procedure and alleging that she had not been discharged for just cause. The matter was submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the required grievance procedure after which the arbitrator ordered Jobes' reinstatement.

Jobes subsequently filed this action for defamation and invasion of privacy; she alleged in her complaint that Tokheim invaded her privacy and unreasonably published the results of her drug test. Tokheim filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Jobes' claims were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 29 U.S.C. SEC. 185(a). The trial court granted Tokheim's motion and this appeal ensued.

Our standard of review is well settled. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). The burden is on the moving party to prove there are no genuine issues of material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once the movant has sustained this burden the opponent must respond by setting forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial; he may not simply rest on the allegations of his pleadings. Stephenson v. Ledbetter (1992) Ind. 596 N.E.2d 1369 1371. At the time of filing the motion or response a party shall designate to Court all parts of pleadings depositions answers to interrogatories admissions matters of judicial notice and any other matters on which it relies for purposes of the motion. T.R. 56(C).

When reviewing an entry of summary judgment we stand in the shoes of the trial court. We do not weigh the evidence but will consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Reed v. Luzny (1994) Ind.App. 627 N.E.2d 1362 1363 reh. denied trans. denied. We may sustain a summary judgment upon any theory supported by the designated materials. T.R. 56(C).

I.

Designation of Evidence

As our standard of review indicates T.R. 56(C) requires a party moving for summary judgment to specifically designate to Court all materials on which it relies to support its motion. The purpose of this requirement is to substantially limit the scope of materials that trial and appellate courts must review in order to determine the propriety of summary judgment. Dzvonar v. Interstate Glass Co. Inc. (1994) Ind.App. 631 N.E.2d 516 518 trans. denied. To that end a party does not comply with T.R. 56(C) merely by designating entire portions of the record; specific citations to relevant evidence are required. Id. However the form by which a party is to designate evidence is not mandated by the rule. National Board of Examiners v. American Osteopathic Association (1995) Ind.App. 645 N.E.2d 608 615. As long as the trial court is advised of the specific material upon which the parties rely then the material may be considered. Id.

Tokheim moved for summary judgment on the basis that Jobes' claims were preempted by federal law. In support of its argument Tokheim designated inter alia the collective bargaining agreement between Tokheim and the Union and the affidavit of Robert Nichols Tokheim's personnel director which stated that Tokheim's management and personnel policies are governed by the collective bargaining agreement. Jobes argues that Tokheim failed to meet the designation requirement of T.R. 56(C) because Tokheim did not include in its supporting memorandum specific references to paragraphs and pages in these respective documents.

In support of this argument Jobes relies on the facts in Dzvonar supra. In Dzvonar the movant "merely referred to the complaint answer and the affidavits . . . without any specific citations as to where evidence supporting its assertions could be found in the mentioned materials." Id. Court concluded that the movant's "general references" did not constitute a sufficient designation under T.R. 56(C). Id.

We believe Dzvonar is distinguishable from the case at bar. Tokheim's memorandum in support of summary judgment referred to the relevant portions of the collective bargaining agreement by specific article number and quoted the relevant language verbatim. Although Tokheim's references to Nichols' affidavit did not contain paragraph references it did refer to the substantive assertions relied upon. Moreover the issue before the trial court was a pure issue of law and the exhibits to which Tokheim failed to make specific references were not dispositive thereto. *fn2 The citations to the collective bargaining agreement and its various provisions sufficiently apprised the trial court of the basis of Tokheim's summary judgment motion. National Board of Examiners supra. We find no error here.

II.

Preemption

The trial court granted Tokheim's summary judgment motion on the basis that Jobes' claims were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ("Section 301") which provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties . . .

29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a). This section not only confers jurisdiction over controversies involving collective bargaining agreements on the federal courts *fn3 but also "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements." Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills (1957) 353 U.S. 448 451 1 L. Ed. 2d 972 77 S. Ct.912. The application of state law is preempted if such application requires the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement; that is if its application is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement such that it cannot be considered independent thereof. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985) 471 U.S. 202 212-213 85 L. Ed. 2d 206 105 S. Ct.1904. Once it is determined that a claim arises under Section 301 the aggrieved union member is bound by the grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agreement unless the member also demonstrates that the union violated its duty of fair representation by failing to pursue the grievance on the member's behalf. United Parcel Service v. Mitchell (1981) 451 U.S. 56 62. *fn4 67 L. Ed. 2d 732 101 S. Ct.1559

The relationship between Section 301 preemption and claims of defamation and invasion of privacy under Indiana state law is an issue of first impression in this jurisdiction. Because this is an issue of federal law we must look to the decisions of our federal courts for guidance. Most factually analogous is the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Schlacter-Jones v. General Telephone of California (1991) 9th Cir. 936 F.2d 435.

In Schlacter-Jones the employer ("GTE") unilaterally implemented a drug and alcohol testing policy. Some time later GTE supervisors observed that Schlacter-Jones appeared under the influence of drugs or alcohol while on duty and ordered her to submit to testing pursuant to the policy. Id. at 438. When tests revealed the presence of cocaine in Schlacter-Jones' system GTE terminated her. Id. The union filed a grievance on Schlacter-Jones' behalf contending that the drug testing policy was an unlawful change in the terms and conditions of employment. Id.

The arbitrator who heard Schlacter-Jones' grievance found that the drug testing policy was not a product of bilateral negotiations between GTE and the union but that the evidence was insufficient to conclude that it was an illegal change in the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator determined that Schlacter-Jones was terminated for just cause. Id. Schlacter-Jones then filed a complaint alleging various state law violations. In concluding that summary judgment in favor of GTE was appropriate the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

The counts for constitutional violations intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud and deceit rest on her charge that she was unreasonably subjected to humiliating and inaccurate drug tests and that GTE breached oral promises to keep information about her drug test and personal problems confidential. Each of these claims hinges on the contention that GTE improperly required Schlacter-Jones to submit to a drug test. There is no dispute that the CBA governs the working conditions of Schlacter-Jones's employment. A drug and alcohol testing program is a working condition 'whether or not it is specifically discussed in the CBA.' Laws v. Calmat (1988) 9th Cir. 852 F.2d 430 433. Only by examining the CBA can one decide whether the drug policy constitutes a working condition legitimately implemented under the agreement and whether the powers granted to management under the CBA contemplate the right to require 'reasonable cause' fitness for duty tests including drug and alcohol screens. These are questions of labor contract interpretation that federal law governs. Schlacter-Jones's state law claims are thus 'inextricably intertwined' with an analysis of the CBA.

852 F.2d at 440 (footnote omitted).

We find this rationale persuasive. Like the plaintiff in Schlacter-Jones Jobes' working conditions are governed by a collective bargaining agreement. Too each of Jobes' claims hinges on her contention that Tokheim improperly required her to submit to a drug test. Accordingly we conclude that Jobes' state law claims are inextricably intertwined with an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement and are thus preempted by Section 301. *fn5 See also Utility Workers of America Local No. 246 v. Southern California Edison Co. (1988) 9^th Cir. 852 F.2d 1083 1087 (California state constitutional challenges to employer's drug testing program preempted by Section 301); Strachan v. Union Oil Co. (1985) 5th Cir. 768 F.2d 703 704-705 (state tort law claims arising out of suspension and testing of employees whom the employer suspected of drug use and mental problems preempted by Section 301).

Jobes attempts to circumvent federal preemption based on the decision of the National Labor Relations Board in Johnson-Bateman Co. and Machinists Local Lodge 1047 (1989) 295 N.L.R.B. 180 131 L.R.R.M. 1393. In Johnson-Bateman the National Labor Relations Board determined that drug and alcohol testing is a mandatory subject of bargaining between employers and union representatives. 131 L.R.R.M at 1396-1397. Accordingly Jobes argues Tokheim's unilateral implementation of a mandatory bargaining subject in this case brought it outside the collective bargaining agreement rendering Section 301 inapplicable.

Jobes' argument is without merit. While it is an unfair labor practice for an employer who is a party to a collective bargaining agreement to make unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining Johnson-Bateman supra (citing NLRB v. Katz (1962) 369 U.S. 736 8 L. Ed. 2d 230 82 S. Ct.1107) Jobes cites no authority for the proposition that the commission of an unfair labor practice renders the collective bargaining agreement inapplicable to the dispute. In fact the procedures and remedies available to unions alleging the commission of an unfair labor practice are expressly dictated by federal labor law. See e.g. 29 U.S.C. SEC. 160.

Whether Jobes was improperly required to submit to a drug test is inextricably intertwined with management's control and regulation of the terms and conditions of her employment. *fn6 Schlacter-Jones supra. Because Jobes' claims are inseparable from the parties' rights and obligations under the collective bargaining agreement they are preempted by Section 301.

Affirmed.

HOFFMAN J. and FRIEDLANDER J. CONCUR.