Debra Ann Collins appeals a decree terminating the parent-child relationship between her and her son. She brings two points of error contending the trial court abused its discretion in determining that she "engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child." We affirm.

When Collins gave birth to her son in November 1991 the child exhibited symptoms of cocaine withdrawal. The hospital performed drug tests and determined that Collins had repeatedly used cocaine during pregnancy. The hospital records indicated that Collins had a history of cocaine and marijuana use. She told the hospital that she did not use drugs during the pregnancy. She also told the hospital that she quit smoking approximately a month before the child's birth and only had an occasional alcoholic drink during the pregnancy. Contrary to her assertions Collins tested positive for drug use immediately after the child was born.

Based on a referral by the hospital Children's Protective Services (CPS) contacted Collins. Neither Collins nor the father *fn1 had a place to live or means of support so CPS placed the child in a foster home pursuant to temporary orders of Court.

A month after the child was born CPS and Collins entered into a "plan of service" which would allow Collins to visit with the child and begin rehabilitation. Collins was to:

attend drug and alcohol treatment

submit to a psychological examination

attend Counseling

find stable living arrangements which included utilities and suitable furnishings such as a bed for the child

find and maintain employment

comply with the terms of her parole and

comply with Court's temporary order which required her to contribute a box of diapers a month.

The plan allowed her to visit the child every other week. Collins attended drug and alcohol treatment sessions in November and December but did not complete the program. She visited the child once in December and once in January but otherwise did not comply with the plan. In April 1992 Collins was arrested for injury to a child. She pled guilty to a misdemeanor and was jailed. The offense was also a violation of her parole so in September 1993 she was transferred to Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID).

This was Collins' seventh child. CPS had some level of involvement with each of the children starting in 1976. Each of the children was primarily cared for by someone other than Collins. A CPS caseworker testified that she had been referred to work with Collins in 1986 because one of Collins' children had suffered medical neglect. The caseworker was also referred to Collins in 1987 for medical neglect physical neglect and neglectful supervision of her children. Before this child was born Collins voluntarily terminated her parental rights of three children.

In two points of error Collins contends that the trial court "abused its discretion" in terminating the parent-child relationship. She argues that evidence of cocaine use during pregnancy and her failure to complete the "service plan" is no evidence or insufficient evidence that she endangered the physical or emotional well-being of her child.

At the time of trial family code section 15.02 governed involuntary termination of parental rights. In relevant part section 15.02 provided:

a petition requesting termination of the parent-child relationship . . . may be granted if Court finds that:

(1) the parent has:

(E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child;

(M) . . . and in addition the court further finds that

(2) termination is in the best interest of the child.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 15.02 (Vernon Supp.1995) repealed by Act of April 20 1995 .74rd Leg. R.S. ch.20 2(1) 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 113 282 (Vernon) (current version at Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 161.001 (Vernon Supp.1996)); see also Act of April 20 1995 74rd Leg. R.S. ch.20 3 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.113 282 (Vernon) (stating that the change in the law does not affect proceeding pending on the effective date of the act; those proceedings are governed by prior law). Thus to support the trial court's judgment CPS was required to prove that Collins engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child and that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the parental rights. Trevino v. Texas Dep't of Protective and Regulatory Servs. 893 S.W.2d 243 246 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995 no writ). Collins only contests the trial court's determination that she endangered the physical or emotional well-being of her child.

The termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights and therefore the evidence supporting the termination must be clear and convincing. Richardson v. Green 677 S.W.2d 497 500 (Tex. 1984); Harris v. Herbers 838 S.W.2d 938 941 (Tex. App.--Houston [1^st.Dist.] 1992 no writ). Under the clear and convincing standard we are to consider whether the evidence was sufficient to produce in the mind of the trial court a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the facts. We review the record to determine if the court could reasonably find that the fact was highly probable. Harris 838 S.W.2d at 941.

In each of her points of error Collins challenges both the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. When both legal and factual sufficiency points are raised we must first examine legal sufficiency points. Glover v. Texas Gen. Indem. Co. 619 S.W.2d 400 410 (Tex. 1981). In reviewing a "no evidence" or legal sufficiency point we are to consider only the evidence and inferences that tend to support the trial court's findings and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Sherman v. First Nat'l Bank 760 S.W.2d 240 242 (Tex. 1988); King v. Bauer 688 S.W.2d 845 846 (Tex. 1985). If there is any evidence of probative value to support the trial court's findings we must uphold the findings and overrule the point of error. In re King's Estate 150 Tex. 662 244 S.W.2d 660 661 (1951).

If there is legally sufficient evidence we must then review the factual sufficiency of the evidence by weighing and considering all the evidence both in support of and contrary to the challenged findings. Id. Court's judgment must be upheld unless it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust or erroneous. Pool v. Ford Motor Co. 715 S.W.2d 629 635 (Tex. 1986); Corpus Christi Teachers Credit Union v. Hernandez 814 S.W.2d 195 197 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1991 no writ). Because the tried of fact is the sole Court of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder's simply because we may disagree with its findings. Herbert v. Herbert 754 S.W.2d 141 142 (Tex. 1988); Rego Co. v. Brannon 682 S.W.2d 677 680 (Tex. App.--Houston [14^th.Dist.] 1984 writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Skrepnek v. Shearson Lehman Bros. Inc. 889 S.W.2d 578 579-80 (Tex. App.--Houston [14^th.Dist.] 1994 no writ).

A CPS caseworker testified that Collins had received CPS's assistance since 1976. Each of Collins' seven children were cared for by foster parents at some time. She had a history of medical and physical neglect and neglectful supervision. At one time the caseworker attempted to place two of the children with Collins' mother. Collins' mother contacted the caseworker when she was unable to control the kids and asked that they be taken to foster care. Collins admitted that she had voluntarily terminated her parental rights of three of her children. She also admitted to using cocaine on the day this child was born. A doctor from the hospital testified that when the child was born it exhibited "classic" symptoms of cocaine withdrawal. Based on tests performed at the hospital the doctor concluded that Collins had repeatedly used cocaine during pregnancy. The doctor also stated that this cocaine use "undoubtedly" endangered the child's well-being. Cf. G. M. v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources 717 S.W.2d 185 188-89 (Tex. App.--Austin 1986 no writ). Collins admitted to only minimal compliance with the CPS "service plan." She also admitted that she was charged with and turned herself in for injury to a child. She pled guilty to a misdemeanor and was placed in jail and was later transferred to TDCJ-ID because the offense also violated the terms of her parole.

In reviewing an involuntary termination of parental rights case the supreme court has stated:

While we agree that "endanger" means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury. Rather "endanger" means to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.

Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd 727 S.W.2d 531 533 (Tex. 1987) (citations omitted).

When reviewing the evidence we are to look at the evidence regarding the parent's active conduct and the evidence showing the parent's omissions or failures to act. In the Interest of P.S. and L.S. 766 S.W.2d 833 835 (Tex. App.--Houston [1^st.Dist.] 1989 no writ). It is not necessary that the parent's conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer harm. Boyd 727 S.W.2d at 533; Trevino 893 S.W.2d at 246; In the Interest of S.K.S. 648 S.W.2d 402 404 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1983 no writ). In some instances conduct directed at another child is sufficient to support a finding that the parent-child relationship should be terminated. See e.g. Stuart v. Tarrant County Child Welfare Unit 677 S.W.2d 273 279 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1984 writ ref'd n.r.e.). Imprisonment is "a factor to be considered by the trial court on the issue of endangerment " but imprisonment standing alone will not constitute engaging in conduct which endangers the child. Imprisonment that is part of a "course of conduct" which endangers or jeopardizes the physical or emotional well-being of the child may be sufficient to support a termination of parental rights. Boyd 727 S.W.2d at 533-34. Drug use during pregnancy is also some evidence of endangerment to the child and is a factor that may be relied on to support a termination. See Vanessa W. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs. 810 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1991) rev'd on other grounds 817 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. 1991) (court of appeals found evidence including illegal drug use during pregnancy sufficient to support involuntary termination but reversed for a new trial because a photo was erroneously admitted; supreme court reversed court of appeals decision on the admission of the photo because Vanessa W. did not show that admission of the photo was "reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper judgment"); G. M. 717 S.W.2d at 188-89 (holding that record contained some evidence that appellant used intravenous drugs but evidence was not clear and convincing that appellant engaged in this conduct during her pregnancy or that it was the producing cause of her child's health problems).

When we consider only the evidence and inferences which support the trial court's judgment there are several factors which indicate that Collins endangered the physical or emotional well-being of her child: imprisonment which resulted from a charge for injury to a child drug use during pregnancy no independent means of support voluntary termination of parental rights with other children failure to comply with the "service plan " and a history of medical and physical neglect of other children. Accordingly we hold that there was legally sufficient evidence to support the trial court's judgment.

Only Collins offered evidence contrary to the judgment. She testified that she just wanted an opportunity to care for the child and that she had never been given that opportunity. She was working on her GED and had completed all the vocational training which TDCJ-ID would allow her to take. She had hopes of becoming a nurse but had no training in that area. She had participated in Counseling while in prison and professed to no longer be using drugs. She testified that she would not use drugs again once she was released from prison. She sent four $5.00 drafts to the CPS caseworker to help care for her child in the period immediately before the termination hearing. Other than using cocaine on the day the child was born Collins denied using cocaine during pregnancy.

Collins' testimony indicated affection for the child and a significant desire on her part to have an opportunity to care for the child. She did not however directly contest most of the factors relied on to support Court's determination of endangerment. The trial Court is entitled to accept or reject the truth or accuracy of Collins' testimony as to her past actions and future intentions. Smith v. McLin 632 S.W.2d 390 392 (Tex. App.--Austin 1982 writ ref'd n.r.e.). Collin's history of medical and physical neglect of her children was well documented in the record. She professed to have corrected her conduct. The trial Court was entitled to believe or disbelieve her claims of reformation. By his decision the trial court indicated that he did not believe her testimony and the record supports this determination. Accordingly we hold based on a review of the entirety of the record that the trial court's judgment is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The record supports the trial court's finding that the evidence clearly and convincingly established that Collins endangered the physical or emotional well-being of her child. Therefore the termination of Collins' parental rights was proper and we overrule Collins' two points of error.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

/s/ Norman R. Lee

Justice

Judgment rendered and Opinion filed February 8 1996.

Panel consists of Justices Lee Hudson and Edelman.