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GREAT LAKES CHEMICAL APPELLANT
vs.
ELIZABETH BROOKS ACTING DIRECTOR OF LABOR AND RICKEY H. BAILEY APPELLEES
 
Case:
No. E 88-134
 
Location:
Court of Appeals of Arkansas Division Two
 
Date:
February 14 1990 Decided
 
Attorneys:
Shackleford Shackleford & Phillips by: Teresa Wineland El Dorado. Allan Pruitt Counsel for Director of Labor Little Rock Arkansas.
 
Court:
JOHN E. JENNINGS J. MAYFIELD and ROGERS JJ. agree.
 
Author:
The Hon. Justice Jennings
 

Rickey H. Bailey filed a claim for unemployment benefits after he was discharged by appellant Great Lakes Chemical. The Employment Security Division denied benefits to the appellee under Ark. Code Ann. SEC. 11-10-514(b) finding that he was discharged for misconduct connected with the work because he had reported to work under the influence of intoxicants. The claimant took an appeal to the Appeals Tribunal which reversed the agency's determination. The employer then appealed to the Board of Review which affirmed the decision of the Appeals Tribunal. The Board's decision is now appealed to this court. Appellant makes two arguments here: (1) that the Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and (2) that the Board erred in not remanding the case to the Appeals Tribunal for the taking of additional evidence. We affirm.

Two witnesses testified at the hearing before the Appeals Tribunal Bill McCord the appellant's personnel manager and the claimant Rickey Bailey. Mr. McCord testified that Bailey was a technician in the packing and shipping area and had worked for the appellant for eleven years. He testified that as part of an undercover investigation with the El Dorado Police Department and the Arkansas State Police the company had an undercover agent working in the plant. He testified that on February 3 1988 the undercover agent saw the claimant smoking marijuana in the bathroom and that on February 5 1988 the undercover agent saw claimant using cocaine in the bathroom. McCord testified that he had been asked not to divulge the undercover agent's identity. He said that claimant was discharged on May 6 for using drugs at work and that such conduct was in violation of the company's written policy. Mr. McCord suggested that the appeal's referee verify the informant's credibility by checking with other police officers. Bailey was not fired until May 6 ostensibly to keep the identity of the undercover agent secret.

Mr. Bailey categorically denied using drugs at work. He said that the undercover agent was a Mr. Ron Wright and that Wright "had problems elsewhere in other agencies." He testified that shortly after he was fired he took a drug test which was negative. On this evidence the appeals referee chose to believe the claimant. The referee said "the best available evidence is the firsthand sworn testimony of the claimant that he did not use drugs while on duty. McCord did not have first hand knowledge of the situation." In affirming the Appeals Tribunal the Board adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the referee.

The Board's findings of fact are deemed conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. Shipley Baking Co. v. Stiles 17 Ark. App. 72 703 S.W.2d 465 (1986). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Victor Industries Corp. v. Daniels 1 Ark. App. 6 611 S.W.2d 794 (1981). Our review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could have reasonably arrived at the result it reached on the evidence before it. Harris v. Daniels 263 Ark. 897 567 S.W.2d 954 (1978). Even if we would have made a different determination on consideration of the same evidence we are not entitled to substitute our findings of fact for those of the Board. Willis Johnson Co. v. Daniels 269 Ark. 795 601 S.W.2d 890 (1980). Here the testimony was in direct conflict. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony as well as the drawing of inferences therefrom are matters to be resolved by the Board and not this court. W.C. Lee Construction v. Stiles 13 Ark. App. 303 683 S.W.2d 616 (1985); Grigsby v. Everett 8 Ark. App. 188 649 S.W.2d 404 (1983).

Appellant contends that hearsay may be sufficient to constitute substantial evidence citing Edwards v. Stiles 23 Ark. App. 96 743 S.W.2d 12 (1988). Had the Board found for the appellant this rule might be applicable. But the question here is not whether the facts would have supported a different finding; rather the issue is whether the evidence supports the finding the Board actually made. Harris 263 Ark. 897. Appellant also contends that the testimony of the claimant was "biased." Certainly it was in the sense that under the law the testimony of a party is never treated as undisputed. Lambert v. Gerber Products Co. 14 Ark. App. 88 684 S.W.2d 842 (1985). This rule of course does not mean that the trier of fact is prohibited from believing a party's testimony. We hold that the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence.

Appellant's second argument is that the Board erred in not granting its request to remand the case to the appeals referee for the taking of additional evidence. Ark. Code Ann. SEC. 11-10-525(2) provides:

Upon review on its own motion or upon appeal and on the basis of evidence previously submitted in the case or upon the basis of such additional evidence as it may direct be taken the board may affirm modify or reverse the findings and conclusions of the appeal tribunal or may remand the case.

We have repeatedly held that the decision whether to remand a case for the taking of additional evidence is one which lies in the Board's discretion. Fry v. Director of Labor 16 Ark. App. 204 698 S.W.2d 816 (1985); Maybelline Co. v. Stiles 10 Ark. App. 169 661 S.W.2d 462 (1983).

In its petition for appeal to the Board of Review the appellant asks that the case be remanded for the taking of the testimony of Mr. Wright. In response to the question "Why was it not offered into evidence at the Appeal Tribunal hearing?" the appellant stated only "Not available." The Board mistakenly thought that it was the claimant seeking to provide additional evidence and wrote a letter denying the request. After discovering the error the Board sent a similar letter to the appellant. On these facts we cannot say that the Board's refusal to remand the case constituted an abuse of discretion.

Affirmed.