The respondents seek review of a final order of Chief Administrative Law Court Felter (ALJ) insofar as it awarded temporary total disability benefits commencing November 25 1994 and continuing. We affirm.

The ALJ found that the claimant sustained an industrial back injury while working as a laborer on September 23 1994. The respondents admitted liability for temporary total disability through October 30 1994.

Nevertheless on September 26 1994 the respondent-employer discharged the claimant from employment. The basis of the separation was the claimant's refusal to cooperate with a drug test which he found to be "personally offensive."

On October 31 1994 the claimant was released to return to regular employment by a "family nurse practitioner." However on November 25 1994 the claimant's authorized treating chiropractor took the claimant "off work" because the claimant's condition had worsened. The ALJ found that as of the date of the March 15 1995 hearing the claimant had not been released to return to work.

Under these circumstances the ALJ concluded that the claimant was entitled to temporary total disability benefits commencing November 25 and continuing. In so doing the ALJ determined that the claimant was not "at fault" for his separation from employment. Further the ALJ determined that the claimant was entitled to benefits regardless of the discharge because he got worse on November 25 1994 and was taken off work. (See Conclusions of Law; tr. pp. 59-60 66).

I.

On review the respondents contend that the ALJ erred in determining that the claimant was not "at fault" for his separation. The respondents also argue that the claimant was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits as of November 25 because they would have re employed him within his restrictions, but for the discharge. We disagree with the respondents' second argument which we consider to be dispositive of the case. Therefore we need not consider the argument that the ALJ erred in finding that the claimant was not at fault for the separation from employment.

In PDM Molding Inc. v. Stanberg P.2d (Sup. Ct. No. 94SC394 June 26 1995) our Supreme Court held that termination's based on "fault" do not automatically bar a claimant's entitlement to subsequent temporary disability benefits. To the contrary Court held that if the claimant establishes that the industrial injury "contributed to some degree" to the post-separation wage loss the claimant is entitled to temporary total disability benefits.

Here the ALJ found that the claimant's condition worsened on November 25 and he was taken off work by the treating chiropractor Dr. Parker. The respondents' argument notwithstanding there is no evidence that Dr. Parker established restrictions which would have allowed the claimant to return to work in a limited duty capacity. Thus regardless of the respondent-employer's willingness to reemploy the claimant but for the separation the claimant was not medically released to return to employment as of November 25. Therefore his subsequent wage loss was to some degree caused by the effects of the industrial injury. PDM Molding Inc. v. Stanberg supra; Pentico v. The Denver Dumb Friends League W.C. No. 4-190-059 August 11 1995.

It is true that the record contains a report from the family nurse practitioner Ms. Blevins dated November 28 1994 purporting to create a limited duty release. Assuming arguendo that a nurse practitioner's opinion concerning medical restrictions is a sufficient basis for determining whether a claimant has been released to restricted employment duties the ALJ implicitly rejected this release and explicitly relied on Dr. Parker's opinion concerning the claimant's inability to work. Because resolution of conflicts in the evidence is a matter for the ALJ we find no basis for setting the order aside. Section 8-43-301(8) C.R.S. (1994 Cum. Supp.). Consequently we need not reach the question of whether a nurse practitioner's opinion concerning medical restrictions is a sufficient basis for granting or denying temporary disability benefits.

The respondents have also argued that the ALJ erred in denying their motion for a continuance. In this regard the respondents wished to present testimony that the claimant was at fault for his separation from employment and that the employer would have re employed the claimant but for the separation. However we need not address this argument. For the reasons set forth above we conclude that if the ALJ had granted a continuance and received the testimony it would have made no difference in the legal outcome.

INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL

David Cain Kathy E. Dean