Of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SEC. 292(a) (1976).

Opinion for Court filed by Circuit Court McGOWAN.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court dismissing a suit in which appellants the United States Labor Party (USLP) the Committee to Elect Lyndon La Rouche (CTEL) and ten individuals who contributed to CTEL in 1976 (individual appellants) sought damages and injunctive relief against appellees the Federal Election Commission (Commission) and various members of its staff.

*fn1 The suit was filed after the Commission concluded on the basis of field interviews with CTEL contributors (including nine of the ten individual appellants) that Lyndon La Rouche a candidate for the 1976 Presidential nomination of the USLP had not raised the requisite amount of contributions to qualify for matching funds under the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act (Act) 26 U.S.C. SEC.(S) 9031-9042 (1976).

In the District Court appellants asserted numerous constitutional statutory and common law claims arising out of both (1) the fact that the Commission conducted field interviews at all and (2) the manner in which the interviews were conducted and the scope of the questions asked. The District Court finding merit in none of these claims denied injunctive relief and granted appellees' motion for summary judgment.

On appeal appellants renew their allegations with particular emphasis on their statutory first amendment and fourth amendment claims. Our task is to determine whether on a reading of the record most favorable to appellants appellees were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

For reasons stated below we conclude that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment with regard to (1) appellants' statutory claim that the Commission is not empowered to inquire during field interviews into issues bearing no relation at all to the subject matter of an otherwise legitimate investigation into a candidate's eligibility to receive primary matching funds and (2) appellant Jones' fourth amendment claim that he was subjected to a warrantless seizure of certain financial documents and bank records. In all other respects we affirm the decision under review.

I.

On October 14 1976 Lyndon La Rouche wrote the Commission requesting primary matching funds for his campaign for the USLP Presidential nomination. One of the eligibility requirements for such funds is that a candidate "certify" that he has received in excess of $5000 in contributions of $250 or less in each of at least 20 states. 26 U.S.C. SEC. 9033(b)(3)-(4) (1976). For these purposes the Act defines the term "contribution" as a "gift of money made by a written instrument which identifies the person making the contribution by full name and mailing address.

"Id. SEC. 9034(a). La Rouche in support of his application submitted a notarized statement that he had raised the requisite amount but provided no documentation of his contributions. Pursuant to inquiries by the Commission staff CTEL La Rouche's principal campaign committee later submitted a computer printout listing contributions in excess of the threshold. But once again the Commission received no underlying documentation of the contributions.

On November 4 1976 the Commission authorized its staff to conduct a field audit in order to verify La Rouche's eligibility for matching funds. That audit which took place shortly thereafter at CTEL's headquarters in New York City revealed that CTEL had in its possession written instruments evidencing campaign contributions in excess of the threshold amount in 18 states and that with the submission as promised of certain additional documentation it would soon cross the threshold in two more states Connecticut and Indiana. But in addition to this soon to be corrected shortfall the audit uncovered many instances where contributions made by money order or cashier's checks raised substantial questions as to whether the contributions were in fact made by residents of the states indicated. *fn2

The audit also revealed a pattern of heavy last-minute contributions from persons listing their occupation as that of "volunteer coordinator" for the National Caucus of Labor Committees (NCLC) an organization that during the last two weeks of the eligibility period received payments from CTEL of more than $310 000. *fn3 It further indicated that CTEL shared office space and common personnel with NCLC and three other organizations (New Solidarity International Press Service Inc. Campaigner Publications Inc. and the United States Labor Party) and that those organizations accounted for 78% Of CTEL's expenditures and 97% Of its debt. These findings seemed particularly significant in light of the fact that CTEL had surpassed the $5 000 threshold by only a narrow margin in at least several states.

On the basis of these findings the Commission staff recommended by memorandum of December 27 1976 that the audit be expanded to include the four organizations closely related to CTEL and that individual CTEL contributors be interviewed to verify their contributions. The memorandum was initialed by among others defendants Potter Steele and Stoltz. At its meeting on December 29 1976 the Commission voted to expand the audit to include the related organizations.

On January 13 1977 the staff indicated by memorandum to the Commission that absent objection it was prepared to begin confirming contributions by means of field interviews with CTEL contributors. This memorandum was initialed by defendants Costa Potter Oldaker Steele and Stoltz. On January 14 1977 after five Commissioners had returned the memorandum and the sixth had not objected the Secretary of the Commission certified that the staff recommendation had been adopted. The Commission staff on January 21 1977 notified CTEL that its contributors soon would be approached for direct verification of their contributions.

During the week of January 26 1977 six of the Commission's agents including defendants Allen Dougherty Sims Vance and Yowell *fn4 either did or attempted to interview listed contributors (including the ten individual appellants) *fn5 in three states Delaware Massachusetts and Wisconsin. They obtained the names and addresses of these individuals from the information CTEL had submitted in support of La Rouche's application for primary matching funds. In six cases (appellants Ford Wayne and Nancy Hintz Jones Mazaris and Toppin) the individuals received personal visits at their homes; in one case (appellant Park) the interviewee was visited at his place of work; and in two cases (appellants Chaplin and Dallas) the interviews were by telephone. Three appellants Chaplin Nancy Hintz and Park stated that they did not wish to talk and the agents desisted.

One appellant who spoke at some length during his interview was Le Roy Jones.

That interview according to Jones *fn6 proceeded as follows: Shortly after 7:45 on the morning of January 26 1977 Jones was awakened by his wife who indicated that she had just answered a knock at their door and that two agents of the Commission wanted to speak with him. Jones went downstairs. One of the agents who identified himself as Vance and produced his Commission identification badge asked Jones how much money he had contributed to CTEL and wanted to know the source of the funds.

Jones apparently indicated that he had given at least some money to CTEL for Vance then asked to see the cancelled checks and inquired when they had been written. When Jones responded that he did not think that he had either bit of information on hand Vance replied in "an extremely threatening tone" that:

If you don't give me the exact information I asked for you cpuld (Sic) get sentenced up to 10 years in jail and be given a $10 000 fine you've got a nice house here you wouldn't want to lose it would you?

A. 30-31. Thereafter Jones upon searching his records for thirty minutes turned over to Vance his tax returns and a cancelled check documenting a contribution to CTEL.

Vance is then said to have asked Jones numerous questions about his political affiliations and beliefs but Jones does not allege that he responded. The questioning next turned to how the USLP raised its money and who its contributors were and Jones answered these questions to the best of his ability. Then Vance once again stating the possible sanctions if Jones refused asked Jones to reveal the bank account numbers of Jones' personal account and that of the USLP and further demanded Jones to sign a statement permitting the agents to inspect his bank records. Jones in great fear, signed the statements. Finally Vance questioned Jones in some detail regarding his activities in the USLP and who paid his expenses though again Jones does not allege that he responded.

At 9:15 A.M. Vance and his partner departed leaving behind a business card in case Jones or his wife wanted to change their story. Both Jones and his wife it is asserted felt thoroughly intimidated and in fear of loss of security and property were (they) not to comply with Mr. Vance's questions. A. 32. In fact as a result of the tension experienced during the interview Jones a 59-year-old retiree who had had more than twelve heart attacks later made a special visit to his doctor. During that visit the doctor took an electrocardiogram for precaution and changed Jones' prescription. *fn7

The results of the field interviews revealed that in neither Delaware nor Wisconsin had La Rouche raised the threshold amount of $5000 or more in contributions of $250 or less. Thus even though CTEL had submitted on February 2 1977 documentation that according to the initial audit would have established La Rouche's compliance with the threshold in the last of twenty states the Commission on February 10 1977 rejected La Rouche's application for primary matching funds on the ground that he had not met the fundraising threshold of section 9033(b)(3)-(4). It is that determination that we today affirm in No. 77-1184.

On April 28 1977 appellants filed this action in the District Court seeking various forms of declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. *fn8 The complaint named as defendants the Commission and ten individuals including the five staff members who initialed the memorandum seeking authorization for the field interviews and five of the six investigators who conducted the interviews. The complaint also named as defendants "unknown agents of the Federal Election Commission." *fn9 Appellants' principal allegations were that the field interviews of CTEL contributors were unauthorized by statute and violative of the first and fourth amendments. *fn10

Before the District Court had taken any action in the instant case the Commission upon reviewing both the results of the inquiry into La Rouche's eligibility for matching funds and various reports of contributions and expenditures required to be filed with the Commission pursuant to 2 U.S.C. SEC. 434 determined that there was reason to believe that the USLP CTEL and the other related organizations had violated certain provisions of the federal elections laws in connection with the La Rouche campaign.

The Commission by letter notified each organization that it was under investigation and explained the suspected statutory violations. The letter to CTEL indicated that Inter alia there was reason to believe the CTEL had violated 26 U.S.C. Section 9042(c)(1) by making false statements in its submissions for matching funds. In furtherance of the Commission's investigation into this matter agents of the Commission began on or before July 14 1977 interviewing additional CTEL contributors in the state of Indiana to verify their contributions to the La Rouche campaign.

On June 24 1977 appellants moved for a temporary restraining order and in the alternative for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission from conducting further personal interviews with contributors to CTEL as part of its continued investigation. The District Court denied appellants' motion.

On July 18 1977 appellees moved to dismiss the complaint and in the alternative for summary judgment. The grounds for this motion were Inter alia that the field interviews were within the Commission's statutory authority and that appellants had failed to state a claim against the individual appellees upon which relief could be granted. Appellees also argued that in any event they were individually immune from suit.

On October 25 1977 the District Court granted the appellees' motion for summary judgment and denied appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction. The District Court found that the actions of the Commission were "reasonable and within the (Commission's) statutory authority." It further concluded that "nothing in the record supports or could support any alleged violation of Plaintiffs' common law statutory or constitutional rights." *fn11

II.

The principal claims for injunctive and monetary relief that we must resolve are appellants' challenges on statutory first amendment and fourth amendment grounds to the field interviews conducted both before and after the Commission refused to certify La Rouche's eligibility to receive primary matching funds. *fn12 Many of the statutory claims at least those addressed to the fact that the Commission conducted any interviewing at all of CTEL contributors during the certification process are analyzed and rejected in our opinion in Committee to Elect Lyndon La Rouche v. Federal Election Committee 198 U.S.App.D.C. 116 613 F.2d 834.

There we held (1) that section 9036(a) of the Act when read in conjunction with section 9039(b) permits the Commission to conduct field interviews as part of its task of certifying a candidate's eligibility to receive primary matching funds where the candidate's threshold submission contains patent irregularities suggesting the possibility of fraud *fn13 (2) that such irregularities were present in the case of La Rouche's application for matching funds *fn14 and (3) that the manner by which the Commission authorized the interviewing of CTEL contributors was procedurally sound. *fn15 It is unnecessary to repeat here the reasoning underlying our decision in 198 U.S.App.D.C. 101 613 F.2d 834.

Nor need we pause long on appellants' statutory claim that the Commission is without authority to conduct field interviews of individual contributors in connection with an investigation into whether a candidate's principal campaign committee has violated 26 U.S.C. SEC. 9042(c)(1) by making false statements in its matching funds submissions. Section 437g(a)(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act provides that if the Commission on the basis of information ascertained in the normal course of carrying out its supervisory responsibilities has reason to believe that a violation (of the Act) has occurred (it) shall notify the person involved of such alleged violation and shall Make an investigation of such alleged violation.

2 U.S.C. SEC. 437g (a)(2) (1976) (emphasis added). Although section 437g (a)(2) does not contain an express grant of authority to conduct field interviews we hold as we did in No. 77-1184 that such authority is implicit in the Commission's power to "make an investigation of such alleged violation." *fn16 It is our view moreover that the Commission properly invoked that authority here inasmuch as it had more than ample reason to believe based on information ascertained during the normal course of carrying out its responsibilities under section 9036(a) of ensuring La Rouche's eligibility to receive matching funds that false statements had been made to the Commission in connection with La Rouche's matching funds submissions.

The statutory and constitutional claims that remain deal not with the fact that the field interviews were conducted at all but rather with the manner in which the interviews were conducted and the scope of the questions asked. Appellants' statutory claim is that even if the Commission has authority to conduct field interviews it exceeded that authority here when its agents inquired into matters bearing no relation whatsoever to the Commission's investigations.

With regard to the first amendment appellants argue that their right to political association was impermissibly chilled as a result of the number of interviews conducted the manner in which they were conducted and the scope of questioning during the interviews. Finally appellants assert that the agents of the Commission in gaining entry into the homes of the individual appellants and access to their financial records violated the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Our task here is to determine whether the District Court properly granted appellees' motion for summary judgment on these claims. In so doing we must assure ourselves that on a reading of the record most favorable to appellants appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A.

Appellants' statutory claim is that even if the field interviews of CTEL contributors were lawfully authorized the scope of the questions asked by Commission agents during those interviews exceeded the Commission's statutory mandate. It is asserted that much of the questioning had little or no relevance to the purpose of the Commission's investigations namely to verify contributions to CTEL.

For example appellant Jones alleges he was asked questions not only about his CTEL contributions but also about his political beliefs and affiliations as well as his activities in the USLP. Thus we are urged to conclude that the Commission's statutory mandate imposes some limits on the scope of questioning during an otherwise lawful field interview and that the Commission exceeded those limits here.

Appellees do not argue that the Commission is vested with unbounded authority to inquire into any matters however irrelevant during the course of an otherwise lawful field interview. Instead appellees assert on the facts presented here that both sets of field interviews were conducted pursuant to the legitimate purpose of verifying individual contributions reportedly made to CTEL and that all questions asked during the field interviews were "relevant and material" to that purpose. It is appellees' position therefore that they are entitled as the District Court held to judgment as a matter of law.

We turn first to appellants' claims arising out of the field interviews conducted by the Commission in determining whether to certify La Rouche's eligibility to receive primary matching funds. In this regard we must determine whether section 9038(b) the source of the Commission's authority to conduct field interviews under the Act imposes any limits on the scope of questioning during an otherwise lawful field interview and if so whether on a reading of the record most favorable to appellants the Commission exceeded those limits here.

It is our view that with regard to the scope of questioning during an otherwise lawful field interview the Commission's authority under section 9039(b) is broad but not limitless. Section 9039(b) is by its own terms a broad grant of investigative power:

(b) The Commission is authorized to prescribe rules and regulations in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) to conduct examinations and audits (in addition to the examinations and audits required by section 9038(a)) To conduct investigations And to require the keeping and submission of any books records and information Which it determines to be necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this chapter.

26 U.S.C. SEC. 9039(b) (1976) (emphasis added). But section 9039(b) is not a plenary grant of such power for it authorizes only those investigative acts the Commission deems "necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this chapter." It thus requires that an investigation bear some possible relation to the Commission's responsibilities under the Act.

If this requirement is to have any meaning we think it must apply not only to the authorization vel non of Commission investigations but also to the scope of such investigations. It would be anomalous indeed if the Act were interpreted so as to permit the Commission to inquire into matters exhibiting no relevance at all to the Commission's responsibilities simply because these inquiries were part of an otherwise lawful investigation. Accordingly we construe section 9039(b) to permit the Commission to inquire during its investigations only into those matters bearing at least some possible relation to the Commission's responsibilities under the Act.

In as much as we already determined in No. 77-1184 that the initial set of field interviews of CTEL contributors were lawfully authorized pursuant to the Commission's statutory obligation to ensure La Rouche's eligibility for primary matching funds we need only decide here whether the questions both admittedly and allegedly asked during those interviews have some possible bearing on the Commission's responsibilities under the Act.

Many of the questions that the agents admit having asked such as whether an individual contributed at all to CTEL how much he contributed and what the source of his money was all have a direct bearing on whether the individual in fact contributed and contributed his own money to La Rouche's campaign. *fn17 These matters fall plainly within the Commission's obligation under section 9036(a) to verify that a candidate has in fact met the fundraising threshold for obtaining primary matching funds where as in La Rouche's case the candidate's threshold submission contains patent irregularities suggesting the possibility of fraud.

This same statutory obligation we think also justifies on the facts presented here a variety of questions allegedly asked concerning the individual appellants' affiliations activities and financial relationships with CTEL NCLC and the USLP. The Commission in processing La Rouche's application for primary matching funds was confronted with the specter of fraud on the part of individuals associated with CTEL and several related organizations.

The Commission's audit of the contributions to CTEL revealed both that numerous last-minute contributions made by cashier's check or money order were given in patterns that raised substantial questions as to whether the contributor in fact resided in the state indicated See note 2 Supra and that individuals who listed their occupation as that of volunteer coordinator for NCLC contributed a high percentage of the funds received by CTEL during the last two weeks of the eligibility period.

During the course of the audit the Commission also learned that NCLC received over $300 000 from CTEL during the last two weeks of the eligibility period that CTEL shared office space and common personnel with NCLC and three other organizations (including the USLP) and that those organizations accounted for 78% Of CTEL's expenditures and 97% Of its debt. Given this combination of warning signals we cannot say that the Commission was unjustified in exploring the possibilities of foul play by individuals associated with CTEL and the related organizations. Thus in light of the facts available to the Commission and given its obligations under section 9036(a) we see no statutory bar to inquiries such as whether an individual belonged to organized with or received funds from CTEL NCLC and the USLP for such inquiries have a direct bearing on the pattern of irregularities and statutory questions raised by the initial audit. *fn18

The only other questions that allegedly were asked during the first set of interviews are the inquiries into the political beliefs of the individual appellants. *fn19 Here we think that appellees were not entitled to summary judgment for we fail to see any possible relation however tenuous between the alleged inquiries and the Commission's responsibilities under the Act. Although the individual appellants' political affiliations with and organizational ties to the USLP CTEL and NCLC might well have had some bearing on La Rouche's threshold eligibility (given the "warning signals" discussed above) it is hard for us to imagine how their political beliefs would have any bearing whatsoever on La Rouche's eligibility for matching funds or any other responsibility of the Commission under the Act. Accordingly at least with regard to the alleged inquiries into the political beliefs of the individual appellants occurring during the first set of interviews we hold that the District Court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment. It is our view that if those inquiries in fact occurred the Commission exceeded its otherwise broad investigative mandate under section 9039(b). *fn20

We turn now to appellants' statutory claim arising out of the second set of interviews namely that the scope of the questions allegedly asked during the interviews conducted by the Commission as part of its investigation under 2 U.S.C. section 437g(a)(2) into whether false statements had been made in connection with La Rouche's application for matching funds exceeded the Commission's statutory mandate. This claim is we think so totally lacking in record support that we need not even decide the precise extent to which section 437g(a)(2) restricts the scope of questioning during an otherwise lawful field interview.

The only affidavit in the record filed by a contributor who was approached during the second set of interviews is that of David Hoagland. A. 33-34. By his own account Hoagland asserts only that the Commission agents asked him if he knew what the Commission represented and when he responded that he did if he would be willing to examine some documents.

After Hoagland refused this request the agents ended the interview. Inasmuch as we see nothing in Hoagland's affidavit or anywhere else in the record that even remotely suggests that the Commission asked questions that exceeded the scope of the Commission's authority under section 437g(a)(2) we affirm that portion of the District Court's opinion granting summary judgment on appellants' statutory claim based on the second set of interviews.

B.

Appellants also argue that the field interviews even to the extent authorized by statute were violative of the first amendment. In this regard appellants assert that the number of interviews conducted the manner in which they were conducted and the scope of questioning during those interviews could have had no foreseeable result other than to chill appellants' right to political association. In response appellees argue that we must weigh appellants' associational rights against the substantial governmental interests served by conducting the field interviews. In light of the governmental interests involved we are urged to conclude that absent any factual showing of harassment against the individual appellants CTEL or the USLP the mere asking of material questions by Commission agents does not rise to the level of a first amendment violation.

It is well settled that political speech is afforded the broadest possible protection under the first amendment. This reflects both our "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited robust and wide-open New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S. Ct. 710, 721, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964), and the fact that discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14, 96 S. Ct. 612, 632, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976).

Moreover inasmuch as "effective advocacy of both public and private points of view particularly controversial ones is undeniably enhanced by group association NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 (1958), the first amendment has been held to protect not only political expression, but also political association.

Nor is this right to political association limited only to protection against direct infringements on associational interests. In a line of cases *fn21 beginning with NAACP v. Alabama id. the Supreme Court has held that the compelled disclosure of an individual's affiliation with an organization may standing alone constitute a serious intrusion on the first amendment right to privacy of association and belief. These cases share the premise that especially where as in NAACP v. Alabama an organization can demonstrate a pattern of harassment resulting from prior revelations of its membership anonymity of membership is often essential for the viability of a dissident or unpopular group.

In the same vein the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo supra held that the right to political association is implicated in the compelled disclosure not only of organization ties but also of campaign contributions. The Buckley Court reasoned that the right to pool money through contributions falls within the ambit of first amendment protection because "funds are often essential if "advocacy' is to be truly or optimally "effective ' " and because "financial transactions can reveal much about a person's activities associations and beliefs." 424 U.S. at 65-66 96 S. Ct. at 657.

The "compelled disclosure" cases from NAACP v. Alabama Through Buckley v. Valeo recognize that under certain circumstances an individual's right to privacy of association may give way to a sufficiently compelling governmental interest for requiring disclosure. Those circumstances are to be sure limited for the governmental interest must (1) survive "exacting scrutiny" and (2) bear "a "relevant correlation' or "substantial relation' (to) the information required to be disclosed." Buckley v. Valeo supra 424 U.S. at 64 96 S. Ct. at 656. But such a showing can be made. In Buckley for example where minor parties challenged the provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act requiring Inter alia the disclosure of campaign contributions in excess of $100 *fn22 Court found three sufficiently compelling governmental interests to uphold the disclosure provisions.

Those interests were (1) to provide voters with information regarding a candidate's supporters so as to assist the electorate in evaluating the candidate Id. at 66-67 96 S. Ct. at 612 (2) to "deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity Id. at 67, 96 S. Ct. at 657, and (3) to enhance the Government's ability to detect violations of the contribution limitations in the Federal Election Campaign Act. Id. at 66-68, 96 S. Ct. 612. In the absence of record evidence of harassment of the sort proffered in NAACP v. Alabama, Court in Buckley concluded that the governmental interests in disclosure outweighed the associational interests of the minor parties.

Applying the analysis of the "compelled disclosure" cases to the facts at hand we have no difficulty concluding that the field interviews of CTEL contributors served governmental interests sufficiently compelling to survive "exacting scrutiny." Two sorts of governmental interests are involved. First insofar as the interviewing of CTEL contributors was conducted to ensure that La Rouche had met the fundraising threshold for primary matching funds the field interviews obviously served the same interests as those underlying the fundraising threshold itself. Those interests as Court in Buckley noted are (1) "Congress' interest in not funding hopeless candidacies with large sums of public money and (2) the important public interest against providing artificial incentives to "splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism.' " 424 U.S. at 96 96 S. Ct. at 671.

Second insofar as the interviewing of CTEL contributors was prompted by a finding of possible fraud in connection with reported contributions to the La Rouche campaign the field interviews also serve the governmental interests underlying all the provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act that would be undermined if a candidate or his authorized committee were maintaining records of fraudulent campaign contributions. *fn23 One such provision is the disclosure requirement upheld in Buckley for it would hardly serve the purposes of that requirement if the disclosures made in response to it were in fact fraudulent.

To do so would not assist but rather mislead the electorate in evaluating a candidate in terms of his financial supporters. Thus inasmuch as the governmental interests served by the disclosure requirement standing alone withstood "exacting scrutiny" in Buckley it follows A fortiori that where as here those same interests are combined with the interests underlying the threshold requirement the governmental interests served by the field interviews are sufficiently compelling to withstand "exacting scrutiny."

It also appears that with two exceptions not of decisional significance *fn24 there was "a "relevant correlation' between the governmental interests and the information required to be disclosed. As we concluded above, *fn25 the questions admittedly asked concerning the amount, source, and date of the individual appellants' contributions to CTEL had a direct bearing on whether the individuals in fact contributed to CTEL, and thus on whether La Rouche met the fundraising threshold.

*fn26 It was also our view that those questions allegedly asked concerning the individual appellants' affiliations activities and financial relationships with CTEL NCLC and the USLP were related directly to the pattern of irregularities and statutory questions raised by the initial audit. *fn27 Compare Pollard v. Roberts 283 F. Supp. 248 (E.D.Ark.) (three-Court court) Aff'd per curiam 393 U.S. 14 89 S. Ct. 47 21 L. Ed. 2d 14 (1968). Accordingly we find a sufficient nexus between the governmental interests underlying the field interviews and the questions allegedly asked during those interviews.

Notwithstanding the substantial governmental interests involved and the direct relation between those interests and the information disclosed appellants urge us to conclude that in light of the minor party status of the USLP the field interviews of CTEL contributors amounted to an undue infringement on appellants' associational rights. Appellants do not argue that their status as a minor party diminishes the significance of the governmental interests served by the field interviews. They assert instead that the membership of a minor party is more susceptible to a chilling effect on associational rights than the membership of a major party.

The unique vulnerability of minor parties and their members to infringements on associational rights was recognized in Buckley v. Valeo where Court noted:

We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to the associational interests of the minor parties and their members and to supporters of independents could be significant. These movements are less likely to have a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in contributions. In some instances fears of reprisal may deter contributions to the point where the movement cannot survive.

424 U.S. at 71 96 S. Ct. at 659. But even so Court in Buckley held that absent a showing of the sort made in NAACP v. Alabama where an organization had "made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members (had) exposed these members to economic reprisal loss of employment threat of physical coercion and other manifestations of public hostility 357 U.S. at 462, 78 S. Ct. at 1172 the governmental interests underlying the disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act were sufficiently compelling to outweigh the possible harm to the associational rights of minor parties and their members.

Appellants assert that they have been subjected to harassment of the sort present in NAACP v. Alabama. In particular they point both to the number of field interviews conducted and the manner in which they were conducted. It is their view that "such activities conducted on a massive scale could have no foreseeable result other than the chilling of a political party's constitutional rights."

Although the field interviews of CTEL contributors no doubt had some chilling effect on their support of CTEL and the USLP we disagree that this is a case comparable to NAACP v. Alabama. The record in this case is devoid of any evidence of a pattern of past or present governmental harassment against the USLP CTEL or their members for the only alleged harassment is that stemming from the two sets of field interviews in connection with La Rouche's application for matching funds.

The first set of field interviews was initiated by the Commission after it discovered patent irregularities suggesting the possibility of fraud among the reported contributions to the La Rouche campaign thereby triggering the Commission's obligation under section 9036(a) to ensure that La Rouche had in fact raised the threshold amount to qualify for primary matching funds.

*fn28 The second set of interviews followed from the Commission's determination on the basis of information ascertained in the normal course of carrying out its supervisory responsibilities under section 9036(a) that there was reason to believe that in contravention of 26 U.S.C. SEC. 9042(c)(1)(A) false statements had been filed in connection with La Rouche's threshold submission. Section 437g(a)(2) Requires the Commission once having made such a determination to conduct an investigation into the alleged violation. *fn29 Both investigations thus were lawful agency responses to findings of possible fraud in connection with the reported contributions to the La Rouche campaign.

Nor do we find a pattern of harassment in the fact that the Commission initially did or attempted to interview as many as 60 CTEL contributors in three states and later as many as 40 more in another state. Given the Commission's findings of possible fraud we see nothing unreasonable about its attempting to interview as an initial matter approximately 20 CTEL contributors in each of three representative states. Moreover in light of the fact that many of those contributors were never located we think it was reasonable for the Commission as part of its section 437g(a)(2) investigation to expand the interviewing to include 40 more contributors in another state.

With regard to the manner in which the field interviews were conducted many of the individual appellants allege that they were harassed or intimidated by the Commission agents. It is our view however that the vast majority of the individual appellants fail to allege facts sufficient to suggest that this "chill" amounted to anything more than the natural response that anyone would have if questioned by a federal agent about campaign contributions. *fn30 The record as a whole we think suggests that the field interviews were conducted pursuant to reasonable investigative procedures.

*fn31 Insofar as the Commission needed a prompt verification of CTEL contributions so as to expedite La Rouche's certification decision we cannot say that the Commission acted unreasonably during the first set of interviews in not providing the individual appellants with notice of their interviews in approaching some of the individual appellants at their homes before they left for work in the morning and others later in the day at their workplaces. The record moreover is devoid of any specific allegations of unreasonable investigative practices in connection with the second set of interviews.

Thus even on a reading of the record most favorable to appellants we think that the Commission was not engaged in an effort to harass the USLP CTEL or their members but rather in a bona fide effort to verify contributions to La Rouche's campaign in the face of possible fraud.

On the record before us we conclude that the governmental interests served by the field interviews were sufficiently compelling to outweigh appellants' associational interests. It is significant we think that the record reveals that the only confrontations between appellants and the Commission arose in response to a finding of possible fraud in connection with the reported contributions to the La Rouche campaign. Although field interviews such as those that allegedly occurred here undoubtedly may discourage some political association we cannot say here that this chill states a constitutional claim. Accordingly we hold that with regard to appellants' first amendment claim the District Court properly granted appellees' motion for summary judgment.

C.

Appellants' final claim is that the agents of the Commission in gaining entry to the homes of the individual appellants and access to their financial records conducted warrantless searches and seizures violative of the fourth amendment. Several individual appellants assert that they were interviewed "without (their) consent and still others claim that they were compelled" to turn over financial documents sign statements and disclose bank records. In response appellees urge us to conclude that inasmuch as the record is devoid of any non-conclusory allegations that the Commission agents used force or coercion the field interviews must be deemed to fall within the "consent" exception to the warrant requirement.

One of the well established exceptions to the fourth amendment rule that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is "Per se unreasonable Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), is a search conducted pursuant to consent." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 412 U.S. 218 219 93 S. Ct. 2041 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). Accord Davis v. United States 328 U.S. 582 66 S. Ct. 1256 90 L. Ed. 1453 (1946); Zap v. United States 328 U.S. 624 66 S. Ct. 1277 90 L. Ed. 1477 (1946).

A consent to search is of course valid only if it "was in fact voluntarily given and not the result of duress or coercion express or implied." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte supra 412 U.S. at 248 93 S. Ct. at 2059. In this regard the Supreme Court following its decisions under the fourteenth amendment involving the voluntariness of confessions has held that the issue of whether a consent to search was voluntarily given is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of circumstances in a particular case. Id. 412 U.S. 223-29 93 S. Ct. 2041.

Upon examination of the affidavits filed below we find that except in the case of appellant Jones the individual appellants have not alleged facts sufficient to support their claim that the field interviews were non-consensual. The only facts alleged by the individual appellants other than Jones to explain how it was that they were coerced into being interviewed are the rather conclusory assertions of the interviewees that they felt "intimidated" by the Commission agents.

A. 29 105 107. They do not allege nor is there anything in the record to suggest that the agents used force or threats to gain entry into the homes of these interviewees to induce them to respond to the agents' questions or to compel them to sign statements or turn over financial information.

The most serious allegation other than that of appellant Jones appears in the affidavit of appellant Toppin who asserts that he was "intimidated" because the agents "were belligerent and because throughout the interrogation the agents were continually misquoting statements (he) had previously made and trying to get (him) to agree to their reformulation and distortion of (his) previous statements." A. 105.

It is our view however that even appellant Toppin's allegation when viewed as it must be in the totality of circumstances falls short of that necessary to demonstrate that his interview was not voluntarily given but rather was the result of duress or coercion. See Davis v. United States 328 U.S. 582 66 S. Ct. 1256 90 L. Ed. 1453 (1946). Accordingly we affirm that portion of the District Court's opinion dismissing the fourth amendment claims relating to the field interviews of the individual appellants other than appellant Jones.

We reach a different conclusion however with regard to appellant Jones. In his affidavit Jones a 59-year-old retiree due to a serious heart condition asserts that the following exchange occurred during his interview with agent Vance: After Jones indicated that he had made contributions to CTEL Vance asked to see the cancelled checks and inquired when they had been written. When Jones responded that he did not think he had either bit of information on hand Vance replied in "an extremely threatening tone" that:

If you don't give me the exact information I asked for you cpuld (Sic ) get sentenced up to 10 years in jail and be given a $10 000 fine you've got a nice house here you wouldn't want to lose it would you?

A. 30-31. Thereafter Jones upon searching his records for thirty minutes turned over to Vance his tax returns and a cancelled check documenting a contribution to CTEL.

Later in the interview Vance is said to have asked Jones to reveal the bank account numbers of Jones' personal account and that of the USLP and further "demanded" Jones to sign a statement permitting the agents to inspect his bank records. When Vance reiterated the possible sanctions if Jones refused Jones in great fear, signed the statements. Throughout the interview according to Jones both he and his wife "felt thoroughly intimidated and in fear of loss of security and property were (they) not to comply with Mr. Vance's questions." A. 32.

It is our view that if the interview occurred as Jones has described it Jones cannot be said to have voluntarily consented to what was otherwise a warrantless seizure of his financial documents and bank records. This conclusion follows we think from the case of Bumper v. North Carolina 391 U.S. 543 88 S. Ct. 1788 20 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1968) which was discussed approvingly in the Supreme Court's leading case on consent searches Schneckloth v. Bustamonte supra 412 U.S. at 222-23 93 S. Ct. 2041.

In Bumper four law enforcement officers were permitted by a 66-year-old widow to search her home after they informed her that they had a warrant but neither showed her the warrant nor read it to her. At a pretrial motion to suppress evidence discovered during the search of the widow's home the prosecution relied not on the validity of the warrant but rather upon the widow's consent to the search. The trial court admitted the evidence on that basis and its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.

The Supreme Court however reversed the conviction on the ground that "when a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent." 391 U.S. at 550 88 S. Ct. at 1792.

Similarly where as we must assume for purposes of this appeal happened here a Commission agent informs a contributor that if the contributor refuses to turn over financial documents he could "get sentenced up to 10 years in jail and be given a $10 000 fine the agent announces in effect that the contributor has no right to resist the seizure of the documents. *fn32

Accordingly the situation here as in Bumper is instinct with coercion and where there is coercion there cannot be consent. In fact the coercion here is even greater than in Bumper for Jones was told in effect not only that he had no right to refuse but also that if he did refuse he would be subject to a substantial loss of liberty and property.

For the foregoing reasons we think that Jones has alleged facts that if true demonstrate that he did not consent to the warrantless seizure of his financial documents and bank records. Thus we hold that with regard to the alleged seizure of those documents and records the District Court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment on the ground that "nothing in the record supports or could support any alleged violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights."

III.

It is our view in sum that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment with regard to (1) appellants' statutory claim that the Commission is not empowered to inquire during field interviews into issues bearing no relation at all to the subject matter of an otherwise legitimate investigation into a candidate's eligibility to receive primary matching funds and (2) appellant Jones' fourth amendment claim that he was subjected to a warrantless seizure of certain financial documents and bank records. In all other respects we affirm the decision under review.