Petitioner appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for order compelling discovery and from the court's grant of the State's motion for summary judgment on his application for post conviction relief. He asserts that the court erred in not finding that due process required the production of documents and data pertaining to the operation of a drug testing machine. He also asserts that he was denied due process by the State's failure to preserve his urine sample for independent chemical analysis. We affirm.

In November 1983 a urine sample was taken from Gary Hoeppner the petitioner in this action to test for the presence of drugs. The sample was processed through the prison's drug testing machine and revealed the presence of THC a marijuana derivative. Hoeppner was penalized four days of good time and placed in solitary confinement for ten days. In response to an appeal a second testing of the urine sample was taken at the Iowa Security and Medical Facility. The results of the re-testing also revealed the presence of THC; petitioner's appeal was accordingly denied.

In February 1984 Hoeppner petitioned for post conviction relief. The petition alleged that Hoeppner's due process rights had been violated since the alleged destruction of the urine sample prevented any independent testing of the sample. In response the State denied the allegation that the urine sample had not been preserved.

Hoeppner filed a motion for production of the urine sample and a motion to discover certain documents pertaining to the use of the prison's drug testing machine. The State resisted the request and filed a motion for summary judgment.

Hoeppner subsequently filed a motion to compel discovery. In its response to request for admissions the State admitted that the urine sample was destroyed.

The post conviction court held that Hoeppner was not entitled to discovery since the materials were not relevant. The court also granted summary judgment for the State reasoning that a prisoner is not entitled to an independent sample of evidence used in a disciplinary proceeding.

Hoeppner claims on appeal that the post conviction court erred in denying his request for production of documents. He argues that it was improper to enter a summary judgment without allowing him to attack the reliability and accuracy of the testing procedure. We disagree.

The role of the district court is not to afford a de novo review of the disciplinary board's fact finding. Willis v. Ciccone 506 F.2d 1011 1018 (8^th Cir. 1974). Rather in reviewing disciplinary actions the only issue of consequence is whether some evidence exists to support the board's decision. Walpole v. Hill 472 U.S. 445 __ 105 S. Ct. 2768 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 53 U.S.L.W. 4778 4781 (1985); Wilson v. Farrier 372 N.W.2d 499 501 (Iowa 1985).

Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses or weighing of the evidence. Instead the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.

Walpole 53 U.S.L.W. at 4781.

In the case before this court Hoeppner requested the production of documents for the sole purpose of attacking evidence relied upon by the board. According to Walpole any inquiry in this respect is irrelevant. We hold that it was proper for the post conviction court to deny petitioner's request.

Hoeppner's second assignment of error is that he was denied due process by the State's failure to preserve his urine sample for independent chemical analysis. We find this argument to be without merit.

The leading authority concerning procedural due process rights in the prison disciplinary context is Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539 94 S. Ct. 2963 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974). In Wolff the court determined that certain legal procedures were essential to due process in a prison setting: 1) advance written notice of the alleged violation; 2) a written statement in the findings of evidence relied on and the reasons for the discipline; and 3) allowing prisoners a limited right to call witnesses and present written evidence. Id. at 564-67 94 S. Ct. at 2978-80 41 L. Ed. 2d at 955-57. However the Court also recognized that "prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Id. at 556 94 S. Ct. at 2975 41 L. Ed. 2d at 951. Certain procedures normally associated with due process are not required in prison disciplinary proceedings: confrontation cross-examination and counsel. Id. at 567-70 94

S. Ct. at 2980-82 41 L. Ed. 2d 957-59.

Applying these principles to the case before this court we conclude that petitioner's procedural due process rights were not violated. The limited rights set forth in Wolff do not entitle a prisoner to an independent sample of evidence used in a disciplinary proceeding. Hoeppner's reliance on State v. Brown 337 N.W.2d 507 (Iowa 1983) to support a contrary conclusion is misplaced since Brown was a criminal case.

In reaching our decision we also note that any independent testing of the urine sample would be of little consequence in a prison disciplinary proceeding. At best such evidence could be used to attack the accuracy of the prison's testing procedures. It would not discount the fact that "some" evidence supports the conclusion of the disciplinary board. This is all that is constitutionally required.

The disciplinary hearing was held in accordance with the requirements set forth in Wolff and sufficient evidence supports the actions of the prison officials. Finding no error we affirm the decision of the post conviction court in all respects.

AFFIRMED.