Plaintiff Carl Lewis appeals the dismissal of his claims against Laboratory Specialists Inc. (LSI) a company hired by his employer to perform an analysis of his urine sample. The test results reported by LSI to the employer reflected that he tested positive for THC. Asserting these allegations Lewis sued LSI and others claiming LSI negligently tested the urine samples its erroneous results caused the termination of his employment and its erroneous results affected his employment opportunities and his general reputation in the community. He claims these allegations set forth grievances for which the law affords relief and therefore the trial court erred in sustaining LSI's peremptory exception which raised the objection of no cause of action. As we agree with Lewis we reverse and remand.

FACTUAL AND PRODEDURAL HISTORY

Lewis filed suit on September 1 1988 against Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) and Laboratory Specialists Inc. He amended the original petition on February 23 1990 to include American Medical International Occupational Health Center (Am-Med) as a co-defendant. *fn1 The amended petition alleges Lewis contracted with ALCOA in September 1987 to provide certain warehouse services for the sum of $14 an hour. It asserts that in late November 1987 he was offered the opportunity to exchange his independent contractor status for employment status. The petition alleges he was then told to undergo drug testing. He submitted to the drug test [urinalysis] and it was performed by Am-Med and analyzed by LSI.

The petition alleges he was initially informed he passed the drug test. Later he was told he failed the drug test and as a consequence would not be made a regular employee and would have his independent contractor status terminated. Despite his protestations that he never used drugs the petition alleges ALCOA failed to order a retest.

The petition alleges that if the drug test results were positive the results were caused by a mistake of ALCOA LSI or Am-Med. It alleges he obtained an independent drug test showing he was drug-free. ALCOA however refused to reconsider its position as to his employment and/or independent contractor status.

Thus the petition alleges Am-Med negligently drew stored processed labeled and/or transferred the samples drawn from him and LSI negligently tested the samples. The erroneous test results caused the termination of his employment. He further alleges the report that he is a drug user affected his ability to find other employment and damaged his general reputation in the community.

In response to the suit LSI and ALCOA filed a joint motion for summary judgment on March 23 1989. Judgment was rendered on May 8 1989 denying the motion as to Lewis's negligence claim against LSI and his defamation claim against ALCOA. The motion was granted as to his wrongful discharge claim against ALCOA.

On September 6 1990 LSI filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action asserting that Louisiana law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent interference with contract rights. The trial court sustained the exception on October 1 1990 allowing Lewis 15 days to amend his petition. Thereafter Lewis filed this suspensive appeal.

LEGAL PRECEPTS

A. Objection of No Cause of Action

The purpose of the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action is to determine the legal sufficiency of the petition. It questions whether the petition alleges grievances for which the law affords a remedy. Whitney Nat. Bank v. Jeffers 573 So.2d 1262 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991); Sajare Interests Ltd. v. Esplanade Management Inc. 459 So.2d 748 (La. App. 4^th Cir. 1984); Reed v. Yor-Wil Inc. 406 So.2d 236 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) writ den. 410 So.2d 1135 (La. 1982). For the adjudication of the objection the well-pleaded facts of the petition are accepted as true. Whitney Nat. Bank v. Jeffers supra.; Reed v. Yor-Wil Inc. supra.

No evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the objection. LSA-C.C.P. art. 931; Smith v. Cole 553 So.2d 847 (La. 1989); Whitney Nat. Bank v. Jeffers supra.; Ustica Enterprises Inc. v. Costello 434 So.2d 137 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983) on reh'ng 454 So.2d 908 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984). The objection is tried on the face of the pleadings and Court accepts the facts alleged in the petition as true determining whether the law affords any relief to plaintiff if those facts are proved at trial. LSA-C.C.P. art. 927; Smith v. Cole supra.; Robinson v. North American Royalties Inc. 470 So.2d 112 (La. 1985). Contrary factual assertions are to be considered defenses which must be tried on the merits. Whitney Nat. Bank v. Jeffers supra.; Sajare Interests Ltd. v. Esplanade Management Inc. supra. The exception must be overruled unless the plaintiff has no cause of action under any evidence admissible based upon the pleadings. LSA-C.C.P. art. 927; Smith v. Cole supra.; Robinson v. North American Royalties Inc. supra.

B. Negligence

It is the basic policy of our law that every act whatever of a man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. LSA-C.C. art. 2315; 9 to 5 Fashions Inc. v. Spurney 538 So.2d 228 (La. 1989). Fault can be the result of neglect LSA-C.C. art. 2316 or the relationship one party bears to another LSA-C.C. arts. 667 2317-2322. Tallo v. Stroh Brewery Co. 544 So.2d 452 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) writ den. 547 So.2d 355 (La. 1989). If the act is predicated on negligence the duty-risk analysis is utilized to determine if the complained of conduct constitutes fault i.e. whether the defendant breached a legal duty imposed to protect against a particular risk. *fn2 Id. Nevertheless despite the broad ambit of the civilian concept of fault liability has not been extended to various forms of negligent interference with contract where performance of a contract is prevented or rendered more burdensome due to the actions of a tortfeasor. 9 to 5 Fashions Inc. v. Spurney supra.; PPG Industries Inc. v. Bean Dredging 447 So.2d 1058 (La. 1984); Herbert v. Placid Refining Co. 564 So.2d 371 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990) writ den. 569 So.2d 981 (La. 1990). *fn3 But see Peacock v. Brightway Signs Inc. 545 So.2d 649 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989) writ den. 551 So.2d 636 (La. 1989).

APPLICATION OF PRECEPTS TO FACTS

Lewis claims the trial court erred by sustaining the peremptory exception as his allegation that he was injured as a result of LSI's negligent analysis of his [urine] sample sets forth a cause of action for which the law affords a remedy. We agree with him. The allegations in his petition set forth a cause of action in general negligence i.e. the breach of the duty to perform the drug tests in a competent and non-negligent manner.

We find an ease of association exists between the rule of law contained in LSA-C.C. arts. 2315 and 2316 which imposes a duty on a tortfeasor to repair damage caused through his negligence imprudence or want of skill the risk of injury which Lewis sustained and the losses which he seeks to recover. Further finding Lewis falls within the intended protection of the rule of law does not offend policy considerations. See PPG Industries Inc. v. Bean Dredging supra.

The precept that liability does not extend to negligent interference with contract rights is not applicable to Lewis's claims. He was not an unknown third party to LSI. Rather when LSI analyzed Lewis's sample it was aware that negligent testing on its part could wrongfully identify him as a drug user. LSI was cognizant that if the test results it submitted to ALCOA were inaccurate both Lewis's reputation and his employment opportunites would be compromised. These damages were directly foreseeable. Thus as the chance of Lewis being harmed was not remote extending LSI's liability to encompass him does not create an undue burden upon LSI's freedom of action. Instead it should foster a greater sense of responsibility within it to perform its drug testing services in a skillful and competent manner. See Id.

Lewis's petition asserts that LSI negligently tested the [urine] samples its erroneous results indicated he tested positive as a drug user and its erroneous results caused the termination of his employment and affected his employment opportunities and his general reputation in the community. Accepting these allegations as true the petition sets forth a cause of action of negligence under LSA-C.C. arts. 2315 and 2316. Therefore regardless of LSI's contract with ALCOA and of Lewis's status as an at-will employee of ALCOA *fn4 if Lewis proves these facts at trial he will be entitled to relief.

For the reasons assigned we reverse the trial court's ruling which sustained the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action.

REVERSED AND REMANDED