ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.

1. Harry Brown appeals pro se from a judgment entered November 17 1995 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York that granted summary judgment dismissing his complaint which named as defendants the New York City Transit Authority ("the Authority") and a number of its officials. The complaint raised a variety of federal and state law claims arising out of Brown's termination from the Authority's employ after compulsory urinalysis revealed positive indications of cocaine use. Brown then unsuccessfully challenged his termination through the grievance procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA") in effect between the Authority and his union.

2. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground inter alia that because Brown was an employee holding a "safety sensitive" position with the Authority the drug test to which he was subjected was not violative of the Fourth Amendment. This appeal followed. On Brown's motion for assignment of Counsel in this Court we dismissed the appeal as frivolous with respect to all claims except those asserted against the Authority which alleged that (1) the drug test to which Brown was subjected was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the grievance procedure available to Brown to challenge his termination was insufficient under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. NYC Transit Authority No. 95-9248 (2d Cir. Apr. 11 1996).

3. Balancing Brown's privacy interest against the government's safety concerns we conclude that Brown's drug test was a reasonable "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n 489 U.S. 602 618 (1989). As Court Weinstein correctly found Brown as an employee responsible for the maintenance and repair of subway signalling systems clearly held a "safety sensitive" position with the Authority. See id. at 620 (probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment may be dispensed with in face of special safety concerns). It should also be noted that the drug test at issue took place in accordance with the CBA which allowed for random testing of "safety sensitive" employees. See Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. 953 F.2d 807 827 (3d Cir. 1991)(in banc) (union may consent to drug testing on behalf of employees) cert. denied 504 U.S. 943 (1992).

4. Finally the CBA's grievance procedure afforded Brown all the process due him. Again balancing Brown's interests in continued employment against those of the government see Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319 334 (1976) we conclude that the CBA's three-tier grievance procedure culminating in arbitration was adequate to protect Brown's procedural rights. See Laverpool v. New York City Trans. Auth. 835 F. Supp. 1440 1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) aff'd 41 F.3d 1501 (2d Cir. 1994)(table).