I. Introduction.

Pending is the defendant's motion for summary judgment in accordance with FED. R. CIV. P. 56. We exercise jurisdiction over this diversity action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SEC. 1332.

II. Factual Background.

On October 11, 1996, Plaintiff Kathy Dickenson instituted this action against Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. in the Wise County (Virginia) Circuit Court. The case was subsequently removed to this court by Wal-Mart on November 20, 1996. Following several months of discovery, a three-day jury trial was scheduled to begin on November 12, 1997. Wal-Mart then filed the motion for summary judgment presently before the court. The pertinent facts as uncontroverted or taken in a light most favorable to Plaintiff follow.

This suit stems from a series of events surrounding two bomb threats directed at the Norton, Virginia, Wal-Mart in May 1996. During that time, Plaintiff was employed at the store as an Assistant Manager. On May 2, 1996, Dickenson received a call at work from a former Wal-Mart customer who threatened to physically harm her. *fn1 Later that day, Norton Police arrived at the Wal-Mart and informed Plaintiff that a Bell Atlantic operator had received a call from an unidentified individual stating that there was a bomb at the Wal-Mart.

Plaintiff avers that she immediately contacted Matt Belcher, the store manager, at his home. Plaintiff was told not to evacuate the store until the district manger, Greg May, was apprised of the situation. Nevertheless, Plaintiff cooperated with law enforcement officials and evacuated the store before Belcher called back with further instructions. The Virginia State Police Bomb Unit and the Norton Police Department did not locate a bomb in the store. Plaintiff contends that Belcher later said that the police "were blowing things out of proportion." (Dickenson Aff. P 2).

The next day, the police returned to the store and informed Belcher and Dickenson that they had received a bomb threat to the Wal-Mart from an anonymous female caller. Dickenson contends that Wal-Mart management was once again indifferent toward the bomb threat. Specifically, Belcher disregarded the advice of the police that walkie-talkies should not be used during the bomb scare. The store was eventually evacuated. It was subsequently re-opened once the police determined that the threat was a false alarm.

Plaintiff developed a migraine headache following the second bomb scare. As a result, she went to the service desk and asked a co-worker, Brenda Back, "if she had anything for a migraine headache." *fn2 Back provided the plaintiff with three pills to ease her headache. Plaintiff maintains that she intended to ingest the pills but did not do so because she did not recognize the pills. In fact, Dickenson had received one Lodine capsule and two valium pills which had been prescribed for Back by a physician.

Upon her arrival to work on May 4, 1996, Belcher summoned Dickenson to the Manager's Office for a meeting. Belcher, Mays, and Cindy Pope, the district loss prevention manager, were present in the office. Pope, the primary spokesperson during the meeting, proceeded to interrogate Plaintiff about her receipt of the prescription pills. Dickenson contends that the hostile tenor of the meeting reduced her to tears as she attempted to recount the incident. Plaintiff then produced the three pills during the meeting. She voluntarily submitted to a drug test in order to prove that she did not take any prescription medicine. Plaintiff was escorted to Norton Community Hospital where a urine sample was taken for analysis. Plaintiff was then suspended from her employment, with pay, pending the results of the drug test.

Immediately following her suspension, Plaintiff sought medical treatment for depression and post-traumatic stress syndrome. She was hospitalized for nine days due to her mental state. Upon release from the hospital, Plaintiff contacted Belcher to obtain the test results. Plaintiff was informed that (1) the urinalysis revealed that she did not consume the pills; (2) her suspension was lifted; and (3) she could return to work. Dickenson, however, has not yet resumed her position at Wal-Mart. Instead, she has taken a medical leave of absence. She is currently being treated with prescription medicine and is receiving long term disability benefits. This lawsuit followed.

Plaintiff asserts that while she was being interrogated on May 4, Pope made defamatory accusations about her in the presence of third parties. According to her complaint, Plaintiff was told that (1) she had committed a federal offense by virtue of her possession of a schedule II drug and (2) her possession of the pills was a felony that could result in imprisonment. Plaintiff also alleges that following this meeting, agents of Wal-Mart published to several employees that Dickenson was "fired for drugs." Dickenson contends that these statements were made with reckless disregard for the truth and in violation of Virginia law. *fn3 Plaintiff also claims that Wal-Mart violated Virginia's statute of insulting words. She contends that the aforementioned false accusations tended to cause violence and a breach of the peace in violation of VA CODE ANN. SEC. 8.01-45 (Michie 1992).

Plaintiff's complaint also contains a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleges that Wal-Mart's handling of the bomb threats and its investigation into plaintiff's receipt of prescription medicine caused her severe emotional distress. She alleges that Wal-Mart's conduct was intentional, reckless, and outrageous.

III. Standard of Review.

In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [it is] entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The court is authorized to examine materials beyond the complaint, including affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and any other material that would be admissible at trial in ruling on the motion. Selman v. American Sports Underwriters, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 225, 242 (W.D. Va. 1988). The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142, 90 S. Ct. 1598 (1970)).

The function of the district court is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine whether a genuine issue for trial exists. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. No issue for trial exists unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. Only facts that may affect the outcome of a case under the applicable law are material. Id. at 248.

IV. Law and Discussion.

(a) Defamation:

(i) Accusations during the May 4, 1996 meeting

Plaintiff alleges that Pope's statements during the meeting at Wal-Mart give rise to a defamation action. Dickenson contends that she was accused of committing a federal offense by possessing a Schedule II drug and that her possession of the pills was a felony that could result in her going to jail. (Pl.'s Amended Compl. P 6). She points out that these statements were made in the presence of Belcher and Mays.

In opposition, Wal-Mart maintains that the statements do not give rise to an actionable defamation claim because the statements were uttered exclusively within Wal-Mart's corporate management. Wal-Mart argues that under the doctrine of intra-corporate immunity, the statements were not "published" as required by Virginia law. Wal-Mart notes that the accusations were made during a meeting between three members of Wal-Mart's management concerning a violation of company policy.

Both parties agree that defamatory statements must be "published" to a third party in order to state a claim for common law defamation. Publication is essential because the basis of the tort is diminution of one's reputation in the eyes of others. Unless the defamatory matter is published to a third person, no such loss of reputation can occur. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS SEC. 577, comment b (1976). "Publication" does not require the printing and mass dissemination of the defamatory statement. Instead, any form of intentional or negligent communication of a defamatory statement to someone other than the originator and the person defamed constitutes defamation. R. SMOLLA, LAW of DEFAMATION, SEC. 4.12[1] (1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS SEC. 577(1) (1976).

Exceptions to this broad definition of publication have evolved. Germane to the instant case is the intra-corporate immunity doctrine. When communication is intra-corporate and is heard by only those who have the duty or authority to receive the information, no publication has occurred. Thus, communication between officers of the same corporation in the due and regular course of the corporate business does not constitute publication to third persons.

The reasoning underpinning this rule is sound. Communication between corporate management is the only means whereby a corporation can inform itself of the business conduct of its employees. A corporation has an obvious interest in ensuring that its business operates effectively and efficiently. Addressing personnel problems and enforcing work place rules is part of the due and regular course of a corporation's business. Therefore, when corporate officials communicate among each other, the law regards their discussions as the legal equivalent of speaking only to one's self. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK of the LAW of TORTS, SEC. 69 (4th ed. 1971).

The Supreme Court of Virginia has long agreed with this approach. In Thalhimer Bros. v. Shaw, 156 Va. 863, 159 S.E. 87 (Va. 1931), the court opined as follows: "The modern authorities hold that a communication containing defamatory matter made to a business associate or servant in the ordinary and natural course of business is not actionable." Id. at 88. The court then explained that some courts treat such statements as privileged, while other courts deem such a communication as unpublished. Id. The court then explained that this immunity should not be invoked merely as subterfuge when the defamatory remarks are communicated to a third person who has no interest in the matter and whose duties do not pertain to the statement's contents. Id. at 90; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Nance, 165 Va. 363, 182 S.E. 264, 270 (Va. 1935). However, business communications are protected when the subject matter is within the reasonable and usual course of business. Thalhimer Bros., 159 S.E. at 89. See also Chalkley v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 150 Va. 301, 143 S.E. 631 (1928) (no publication under Virginia law when communication is between persons have a duty and interest in the subject).

Virginia law is in accordance with the vast majority of jurisdictions nationwide. Defendant has cited several examples of courts embracing the doctrine of intra-corporate immunity. This court could fill many pages with cases holding that until the defamatory statement is communicated outside the corporate structure it has not been "published." Instead, we reference only a sampling of recent decisions which we find most instructive. See Agee v. Huggins, 888 F. Supp. 1573, 1580 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Ziobro v. Connecticut Inst. for the Blind, 818 F. Supp. 497, 503 (D. Conn. 1993); Lovelace v. Long John Silver's, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1309 (10th Cir. 1990); Moore v. American Express Co., 663 F. Supp. 97, 98 (S.D. W.V. 1987); Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205, 75 L. Ed. 2d 438, 103 S. Ct. 1194 (1983).

In the case at bar, Wal-Mart had a right, if not a duty, to investigate the facts surrounding Plaintiff's receipt of prescription drugs from a co-worker. Plaintiff acknowledges as much. (Dickenson Aff. P 9). The only people present to hear Pope's accusations were two Wal-Mart managers with corporate responsibility for the issue. Mays, the district manager, was responsible for overseeing the personnel at the Norton store. Belcher, the store manager, directly supervised Plaintiff. Similarly, Pope's duties included handling issues related to violations of employment policy. These statements were made within the regular and due course of business. Plaintiff does not contend that anyone present during the meeting repeated what Pope said during the investigation. Thus, Pope's statements during the meeting fall within the scope of the intra-corporate immunity rule and were not "published" as required for an actionable defamation claim.

Plaintiff argues that while Wal-Mart had the right to investigate the incident, it had no license to make false allegations. Plaintiff urges the court to permit a jury to decide whether the statements were actually communicated in the ordinary course of business and whether Pope had a factual basis for accusing her of committed a felony. Plaintiff also contends that Wal-Mart enjoyed only a qualified privilege to make statements in the course of its investigation. She maintains that Wal-Mart abused that privilege by maliciously disregarding the falsity of the allegations.

Plaintiff's position is unavailing. Whether Pope's statements regarding Dickenson were false or were uttered negligently is immaterial. Since the statements have not been published, no claim for defamation exists. Only where an intra-corporate communication is made to an individual who does not have authority to receive that communication will publication have occurred. Furthermore, to the extent that Wal-Mart's qualified privilege could have been lost, no evidence of malice has been presented to support such an argument. The evidence indicates that Plaintiff had a positive working relationship with Wal-Mart management. In addition, no evidence exists that Defendant exhibited a reckless disregard for the truth. *fn4

(ii) Defamatory rumors at the work place.

Plaintiff also alleges she has an actionable claim for defamation because "agents, servants and employees of Wal-Mart have published to third parties that the Plaintiff was 'fired for drugs', or words to that effect. These publications were made with reckless disregard for the truth and with reckless disregard for the Plaintiff's rights." (Pl.'s Amended Compl. P 9).

Dickenson alleges that soon after her suspension, rumors began to spread throughout Wal-Mart that she had been fired for drugs. Dickenson argues that the only reasonable source of these rumors is that Wal-Mart management published the statements. She points to numerous inconsistencies in Pope's deposition testimony to buttress her theory that the entire episode was retaliation for her disagreement with management over the way the store handled the bomb threats.

Wal-Mart counters with two points. First, Wal-Mart argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish that it played any role in the publication of the alleged rumors regarding Dickenson. Second, Wal-Mart asserts that to the extent that any rumors were spread by its employees, they were not made within the scope of employment or in furtherance of Wal-Mart's business.

Wal-Mart does not contest the fact that rumors existed at the Norton store regarding Plaintiff's absence from work. However, citing Federal Land Bank v. Birchfield, 173 Va. 200, 3 S.E.2d 405 (1939), Wal-Mart maintains that it is entitled to know which of its agents spoke the defamatory words and to whom the statements were made. Wal-Mart notes that Plaintiff has failed to introduce any evidence on this point. Instead, Plaintiff relies on the existence of rumors from unidentified sources. While Dickenson has alleged in her deposition that she believed Belcher said that she was fired for drugs, that allegation, Defendant argues, has not been corroborated during extensive discovery. As a result, Wal-Mart asserts that to hold it liable "would turn the law of agency on its end and hold Wal-Mart accountable for unattributable scuttlebutt." (Def.'s Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. Summ. J. at 12).

To survive Wal-Mart's summary judgment motion, Plaintiff must produce evidence of specific facts which establish each element of defamation. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). Under Virginia law, the elements of defamation are: (1) publication by the defendant regarding the plaintiff; (2) an actionable statement; and (3) intent. Ramey v. Kingsport Publishing Corp., 905 F. Supp. 355, 358 (W.D. Va. 1995) (citing Chapin v. Greve, 787 F. Supp. 557, 562 (E.D. Va. 1992)). In this case, the court finds no genuine issue exists for trial concerning publication of the defamatory statements by Wal-Mart.

Plaintiff contends that the rumors are legally attributable to Wal-Mart. Plaintiff maintains that she told only her husband about what transpired during the meeting. Plaintiff alleges Belcher informed a group of assistant managers that she was suspended. By extension, Plaintiff concludes that Wal-Mart must have published the defamatory statements to its employees.

Plaintiff's position misses the mark. Courts throughout the country have consistently assessed similar claims. Store-wide rumors do not provide a sufficient nexus between a corporate defendant and the defamatory statements to sustain a claim of defamation. See, e.g., Jones v. Johnson & Johnson, McNeil-PPC, Inc., No. 94-7473, 1997 WL 549995, *10-*11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1997); Lopez v. Ingram Micro, Inc., No. 95-2004, 1997 WL 401585, *8 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 1997); Smith v. St. Regis Corp., 850 F. Supp. 1296 (S.D. Miss. 1994), aff'd, 48 F.3d 531 (1995); Manning v. Cigna Corp., 807 F. Supp. 889, 899 (D. Conn. 1991); Phillips v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc., No. 90-5603, 1991 WL 27425, *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 1991). As a result, a corporation is not liable in defamation for widespread rumors and gossip among store employees. Westfall v. GTE North, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 707, 714 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 393 (5th Cir. 1987); Meyers v. Amerada Hess Corp., 647 F. Supp. 62, 66-67 (S.D. N.Y. 1986). Rather, a corporation is liable for the defamatory statements of its agents only when the statements are referable to the agent's duty to the corporation and made in the course of discharging that duty. See Thomas v. St. Luke's Health Sys., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1413, 1444 (N.D. Iowa 1994), aff'd, 61 F.3d 908 (8th Cir. 1995). See also Oberbroeckling v. Lyle, 234 Va. 373, 362 S.E.2d 682, 687 (Va. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988) (corporation may be liable for defamatory statements which were "uttered by an agent in the scope of his employment and which grow out of an act connected with the employment.").

Instantly, the presence of rumors at the store does not support an inference that the statements were published by Wal-Mart. No evidence has been introduced that the rumors regarding Plaintiff originated from Wal-Mart management or anyone else whose comments Defendant could be liable. Clearly, the record indicates that Plaintiff has been unable to establish that Wal-Mart was responsible for the gossip circulating at the store.

Plaintiff's testimony at her August 5, 1997 deposition substantially undercuts her position. Plaintiff contends that several employees at Wal-Mart informed her of the ongoing rumors about her employment situation. However, even Plaintiff's testimony reveals that the source of these rumors is unknown. When specifically asked about the source of the defamatory comments, Plaintiff testified as follows: "It was just rumors around the store, you know. I really couldn't pinpoint exactly who said what. . . . Just everyday rumors you hear. . . . I don't know where they got their information, just circulating through the store. . . . I don't know where they got it from. I don't know where it started from. I don't know what person in Wal-Mart started it." (Dickenson Dep. at 137, 143, 149, 180). When asked if she could identify and attribute the comments to somebody, she replied, "no." (Id. at 143). *fn5

The deposition testimony of numerous Wal-Mart employees further supports Defendant's position. Employee after employee testified under oath that while they may have heard gossip or speculation about Plaintiff's employment status, they could not identify the source of the rumors. (See Meade Dep. at 6-8; Farland Dep. at 75; Stanley Dep. at 150). Even Plaintiff's mother, who also worked at Wal-Mart, could not attribute the gossip to any particular source. (Vandergriff Dep. at 24). In fact, several employees, including two of Plaintiff's cousins, specifically testified that the defamatory comments were not made by members of management. (See Meade Dep. at 6-8; Reed Dep. at 13, 15). To the contrary, at least one employee recalls Belcher urging the employees to be considerate of Plaintiff's mother during the ordeal. (Reed Dep. at 15). Several other employees did not even know such rumors existed. (Id. at 13; Summers Dep. at 113).

Belcher's sworn affidavit is consistent with the deposition testimony of the Wal-Mart employees. Belcher stated that he never told anyone that Dickenson was fired for drugs because such a statement would not be true. (Belcher Aff. P 3) Belcher noted that Dickenson has never been fired, but had taken a medical leave of absence. (Id.). Belcher testified that after Dickenson filed this lawsuit, employees raised question during a regularly scheduled meeting. (Id. at P 4). Belcher "simply responded to the questions associate had concerning the lawsuit." Id.

Absent some proof that the rumors are attributable to Wal-Mart, this court cannot hold it liable for defamation. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim regarding the rumors at the store is dismissed.

(b) Virginia's Insulting Words Statute.

Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that Wal-Mart violated Virginia's insulting words statute. That statute provides that "all words shall be actionable which from their usual construction and common acceptance are construed as insults and tend to violence and breach the peace." VA. CODE ANN. SEC. 8.01-45 (Michie 1992). "Although application of this provision is no longer confined to its original purpose of preventing duels, it has been interpreted by Virginia courts to be virtually co-extensive with the common law action for defamation." Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 195 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Potamic Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280, 1284 (4th Cir. 1987)).

At least two exceptions exist, however, between common law defamation and the statutory tort. First, no publication is required to maintain an action under the statute. Gazette, Inc. v Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713, 720 n.1 (Va. 1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985) (citing Davis v. Heflin, 130 Va. 169, 107 S.E. 673 (Va. 1921)). Thus, statements made only to the plaintiff are actionable, whereas common law defamation requires that the defamatory statement be communicated to a third party. See Potamic Valve & Fitting Inc., 829 F.2d at 1284, n. 9 (citations omitted). Second, the insulting words statute "plainly requires that the words used must not only be insults, but they must also 'tend to violence and breach of the peace'." Allen & Rocks, Inc. v. Dowell, 252 Va. 439, 477 S.E.2d 741, 742 (Va. 1996); Darnell v. Davis, 190 Va. 701, 58 S.E.2d 68, 70 (Va. 1950).

Dickenson alleges that the allegations during the May 4, 1997 meeting fall within the purview of the statute. This court disagrees. According to Plaintiff, she was accused by her employer during an internal investigation of committing a felony punishable by imprisonment for possessing a Schedule II drug. While that statement is not entirely accurate, Plaintiff did in fact receive prescription drugs without authorization in violation of federal law. The court has discerned no evidence that this accusation was intended or reasonably expected to cause violence or breach the peace. Therefore, plaintiff's insulting words claim must be dismissed. See Lane v. David P. Jacobson & Co., 880 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (E.D. Va. 1995) (dismissing claim on similar grounds); Dwyer, 867 F.2d at 195 (same).

(c) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Plaintiff's brief in opposition to summary judgment does not address her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. However, during a hearing on September 24, 1997, plaintiff generally discussed the basis for the claim. She asserted that agents of Wal-Mart acted outrageously in their handling of the bomb scare and in the course of their investigation into whether plaintiff violated company policy. Specifically, she cites the delay in evacuating the store and the use of walkie-talkies which could have detonated a bomb. Plaintiff also alleges that Pope never verified the facts of her accusations despite having a pharmacist available for clarification. Plaintiff contends that those actions caused her a nervous breakdown.

In opposition, Wal-Mart asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Wal-Mart challenges Plaintiff's evidence that the conduct at issue meets the rigorous requirements of outrageous conduct necessary to state a claim. Wal-Mart alleges that no evidence exists that its agents engaged in intentional or reckless conduct that was intended to inflict emotional distress on Dickenson.

In order to set out a prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Dickenson must show (1) that Wal-Mart's conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) that the conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality; (3) that there was a causal connection between Wal-Mart's conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) that the emotional distress was severe. Ruth v. Fletcher, 237 Va. 366, 377 S.E.2d 412, 413 (Va. 1989) (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974)). Courts in Virginia do not generally favor actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Levine v. McLeskey, 881 F. Supp. 1030, 1053 (E.D. Va. 1995) (citing Ruth, 377 S.E.2d at 415-16). As a result, liability exists only in the most outrageous of circumstances. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 112 (4th Cir. 1989). Cases which have recognized an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against a plaintiff's employer are particularly uncommon. Mundy v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 676 F.2d 503, 505 (11th Cir. 1982).

A threshold requirement of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Virginia law is a showing of "outrageous and intolerable" conduct that offends generally accepted standards of morality and decency. Gaiters v. Lynn, 831 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Womack, 210 S.E.2d at 148). The conduct giving rise to emotional distress must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Ruth, 377 S.E.2d at 413. Whether the challenged conduct is sufficiently outrageous is a question of law for the court. Dwyer, 867 F.2d at 194 (citing Gaiters, 831 F.2d at 53); Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (Va. 1991).

As a matter of law, this court concludes that Wal-Mart's conduct, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Dickenson, was not severe enough to be deemed outrageous and atrocious as is required to maintain a claim for this tort. The conduct Plaintiff bases her claim on occurred during the bomb threat and at the meeting in the Manager's Office. While not heeding the advice of the police by using walkie-talkies during a bomb scare may not have been the most responsible conduct, in this court's estimation, it is not beyond the bounds of all decency and utterly intolerable. Similarly, the court does not doubt that Pope may have exhibited better judgment and professionalism when she confronted Dickenson. However, "liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression or other trivialities." Levine, 881 F. Supp. at 1054 (quoting Simmons v. Norfolk W. Ry. Co., 734 F. Supp. 230, 231 (W.D. Va. 1989)). Accordingly, the court will grant Wal-Mart's summary judgment motion and dismiss Plaintiff's claim.

V. Conclusion.

For the aforementioned reasons, this court concludes that Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted. Each of Plaintiff's claims will be dismissed. An appropriate order will be entered. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of record.

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion entered this day, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. This case shall be stricken from the active docket. The clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record.

ENTERED: This 3 day of November 1997.

GLEN M. WILLIAMS

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE