Linda I. Thomas (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial of two counts of making or uttering a false or forged prescription in violation of Code SEC.18.2-258.1(E). On appeal she argues that the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to convict because the Commonwealth failed to prove that: (1) the prescriptions were for drugs; (2) the prescriptions were forged; and (3) she made or uttered the prescriptions. Finding no error we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On July 27 1994 appellant and a companion entered the pharmacy owned by Dr. Michael J. Mangano a licensed pharmacist. Dr. Mangano's clerk handed him two prescriptions purportedly ordered by Dr. James F. Hamilton. The prescriptions were for Tylenol No. 4 which contains codeine and Xanax an anxiety medication. Dr. Mangano had filled over 5 000 of Dr. Hamilton's prescriptions and was familiar with both his signature and his method of prescribing medication. He called Dr. Hamilton to verify the prescriptions. After this telephone call he immediately notified the police of a possible irregularity and filled the prescriptions.

Dr. Mangano did not see who initially left the prescriptions but called the name "Carrie Brown " which was listed on the requests. Appellant responded to the name and Dr. Mangano "Counseled her" about the pills referring to her as "Carrie Brown." After appellant left the store with the medication Lieutenant Wilkins and Captain Neale of the Northumberland County Sheriff's Department confronted her in the parking lot and questioned her about the prescriptions. Appellant was "very vague at first." She then said Carrie Brown was a friend but could not give an address phone number or other identifying information for her.

PRESCRIPTION FOR "DRUGS"

Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that the items requested in the prescriptions were "drugs." We disagree.

"When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal of a criminal conviction we must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and accord to the evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Traverso v. Commonwealth 6 Va. App. 172 176 366 S.E.2d 719 721 (1988). "The judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Martin v. Commonwealth 4 Va. App. 438 443 358 S.E.2d 415 418 (1987).

Code SEC. 18.2-258.1 provides as follows:

A. It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or attempt to obtain any drug or procure or attempt to procure the administration of any controlled substance or marijuana: (i) by fraud deceit misrepresentation embezzlement or subterfuge; or (ii) by the forgery or alteration of a prescription or of any written order; or (iii) by the concealment of a material fact; or (iv) by the use of a false name or the giving of a false address.

B. It shall be unlawful for any person to furnish false or fraudulent information in or omit any information from or willfully make a false statement in any prescription order report record or other document required by Chapter 34 of Title 54.1.

C. It shall be unlawful for any person to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance or marijuana a license number which is fictitious revoked suspended or issued to another person.

D. It shall be unlawful for any person for the purpose of obtaining any controlled substance or marijuana to falsely assume the title of or represent himself to be a manufacturer wholesaler pharmacist physician dentist veterinarian or other authorized person.

E. It shall be unlawful for any person to make or utter any false or forged prescription or false or forged written order.

F. It shall be unlawful for any person to affix any false or forged label to a package or receptacle containing any controlled substance.

G. This section shall not apply to officers and employees of the United States of this Commonwealth or of a political subdivision of this Commonwealth acting in the course of their employment who obtain such drugs for investigative research or analytical purposes or to the agents or duly authorized representatives of any pharmaceutical manufacturer who obtain such drugs for investigative research or analytical purposes and who are acting in the course of their employment; provided that such manufacturer is licensed under the provisions of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act; and provided further that such pharmaceutical manufacturer its agents and duly authorized representatives file with the Board such information as the Board may deem appropriate.

H. Any person who shall violate any provision herein shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.

(Emphasis added). The Virginia Drug Control Act defines "prescription" as "an order for drugs or medical supplies." Code SEC. 54.1-3401. "While penal statutes must be strictly construed against the Commonwealth the plain obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always preferred to any curious narrow or strained construction; a statute should never be construed so that it leads to absurd results.'" Newton v. Commonwealth 21 Va. App. 86 89 462 S.E.2d 117 119 (1995) (quoting Branch v. Commonwealth 14 Va. App. 836 839 419 S.E.2d 422 424 (1992)).

Examining the plain meaning of Code SEC. 18.2-258.1(E) we hold that the term "prescription" refers to "an order for drugs or medical supplies." In this case Dr. Mangano testified that the prescriptions at issue were for pain and anxiety medicine. One of the prescriptions was for Tylenol Number 4 which contains sixty milligrams of codeine. This testimony was sufficient to identify the substances listed in the prescriptions as "drugs."

LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY AS TO HANDWRITING

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Mangano's testimony to establish that the signatures on the prescriptions were not Dr. Hamilton's.

At trial Dr. Mangano testified that he had filled over 5 000 prescriptions for Dr. Hamilton and was familiar with his signature. He examined the two prescriptions and stated that they were not signed by Dr. Hamilton. He also testified that Dr. Hamilton did not normally prescribe the types or quantities of drugs contained in the prescriptions nor the number of refills indicated. Appellant argued that in the absence of a showing that Dr. Hamilton was unavailable Dr. Mangano's lay opinion as to the authenticity of the signatures was inadmissible.

"[A] [lay] witness is competent to testify to the genuineness of a controverted signature if he has the proper knowledge of the party's handwriting." Pepper v. Barnett 63 Va. 405 407 (1872). The lack of familiarity with the handwriting of another affects the weight of the testimony not its admissibility. Id. The party offering the handwriting evidence is not required to show that the author is unavailable. See Goulkes v. Commonwealth 41 Va. 836 841 (1843). See also 1 Charles E. Friend The Law of Evidence in Virginia

SEC. 15-9 at 627-28 (4th ed. 1993).

In the instant case the evidence established that Dr. Mangano was very familiar with Dr. Hamilton's signature having filled over 5 000 prescriptions written by Dr. Hamilton. After questioning the authenticity of the prescriptions Dr. Mangano called Dr. Hamilton to verify them and immediately after the conversation called the police. Dr. Mangano testified that the signatures on the two prescriptions were not Dr. Hamilton's and that Dr. Hamilton did not normally prescribe these types and quantities of drugs nor the number of refills. Additionally the Commonwealth introduced into evidence without objection an authentic prescription of Dr. Hamilton that clearly differed from the two presented in this case. The testimony of Dr. Mangano was clearly admissible and his intimate knowledge of Dr. Hamilton's signature was entitled to great weight. The pharmacist's testimony was competent not inherently incredible and was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prescriptions had been forged.

UTTERING A PRESCRIPTION

Lastly appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that she made or uttered the prescriptions.

"Uttering" is defined as "'to put or send [as a forged check] into circulation . . . to utter and publish.' It is an assertion by word or action that a writing known to be forged is good and valid." Ramsey v. Commonwealth 2 Va. App. 265 269 343 S.E.2d 465 468 (1986) (quoting Bateman v. Commonwealth 205 Va. 595 599-600 139 S.E.2d 102 106 (1964)).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth the evidence proved that appellant entered the pharmacy with a companion. Dr. Mangano's store clerk then handed him two prescriptions to be filled. After Dr. Mangano filled the prescriptions he called the name "Carrie Brown " listed on the prescriptions. Appellant responded and Dr. Mangano proceeded to Counsel her on the medicine. Appellant then left the store with the drugs. Under these circumstances the trial court was entitled to infer that appellant had not only picked up the drugs for "Carrie Brown " but also was the one who gave the prescriptions to the clerk. The trial court was not required to believe appellant's self-serving testimony that the prescriptions were for a friend. See Daniel v. Commonwealth 15 Va. App. 736 744 427 S.E.2d 423 428 (1993) ("The trial court as the trier of fact is not required to accept any of [appellant's] testimony and may rely on it in whole in part or reject it completely."). Thus the evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant made or uttered the forged prescriptions in violation of Code SEC. 18.2-258.1(E).

Accordingly the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Affirmed.